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ABSTRACT
This article explores a common but essentially unexplored feature of appellate
decision-making: decisions by irregular panels. Decisions in the federal courts of
appeals are usually reached by panels of three statutorily authorized judges. But
appellate panels are often irregular in practice, either because an authorized judge
becomes unavailable or because an unauthorized judge is assigned as a panel
member. The traditional approach, supported by both statute and case law, has
been to accept the former while rejecting the latter. When considered functionally,
however, decisions by quorum are at least as problematic as those by panels with
unauthorized members. The absence of a third judge deprives a panel of important
contributions that potentially affect the direction, content, or legitimacy of the final
product. These contributions come at a cost, but not one as substantial as might be
imagined. Moreover, the actual cost is likely to be smaller than the perceived cost to
the other panel members, while the potential benefits are likely to be greater. For
these reasons, the current approach of allowing panel members to decide when to
proceed by quorum produces undesirable results. In its place, a firm requirement of
regularity – that is, decision by three authorized judges – should be implemented.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits stemming from the events of September 11, 2001
continue to work their way through the American courts. In April
2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided an interlocutory appeal in one such suit. Benzman v.
Whitman1 involved claims brought by a putative class against
government officials who allegedly “misled the plaintiff class
members by stating that the air quality in the period after the
destruction of the World Trade Center towers was safe enough to
permit return to homes, schools, and offices.”2 The district judge had
denied motions to dismiss by government officials and agencies; the
Second Circuit panel reversed and “remanded with directions to
dismiss the Complaint.”3
From a substantive perspective, Benzman raises interesting
questions about the extent of constitutional and statutory obligations
imposed on governmental actors in the face of extreme emergency.
1

523 F.3d 119 (2d. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 123.
3
Id. at 134.
2
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But Benzman is also interesting for a procedural reason: the reversal
was entered not by a traditional panel of three judges, but instead by a
quorum of two. Senior Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg had been
assigned to the appellate panel but recused himself before oral
argument.4 Rather than assign a replacement, the remaining two
judges heard and decided the appeal on their own. This course of
action is irregular, but not impermissible. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)
specifically authorizes two judges of an appellate panel to act as a
quorum, and most federal circuits have used local rules to confer broad
discretion to exercise that authority in cases where an assigned judge
is permanently absent from the decision-making process due to
recusal, retirement or death.5 Under the prevailing approach, then, the
remaining two judges might have sought a replacement for Judge
Feinberg, but they were not compelled to do so.
Decision by quorum is an example of a tolerated form of panel
irregularity in the federal appellate system. A competing form of
irregularity is plainly not tolerated. The Supreme Court has
consistently found that only authorized judges may participate in the
appellate decision-making process, and that any deviation from this
requirement is reversible error. Thus, in Nguyen v. United States, the
inclusion of an Article I judge rendered a panel powerless to exercise
judicial power, even though the two other judges were undeniably
authorized and in agreement.6 Although the analysis in Nguyen
focused on statutory formation rules, the opinion’s rhetoric echoes a
broader principle appearing in cases dating back to the formation of
the modern federal appellate courts: panels involving unauthorized
judges are categorically problematic.7
Put together, the prevailing approach to panel formation and
composition seems to be as follows. All appeals must be assigned in
the first instance to a panel of three authorized judges. If an assigned
4

It is unclear precisely when the recusal occurred. The opinion itself simply
notes that Judge Feinberg “recused himself,” while saying nothing about the timing
of the recusal. Id. at 122 n. **. But the docket sheet indicates that the oral argument
was heard by two judges, so the recusal seems to have occurred at some point prior
to the scheduled oral argument.
5
In Benzman, the applicable local rule is Second Circuit Local Rule § 0.14(b).
For further discussion of the local rules and practices relating to quorum decisions in
the federal appellate courts, see infra Part III.A.
6
Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
7
See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?,
available via SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1128311.
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judge becomes unavailable, the panel may decide with only two
judges, subject to local rules that restrict the statutory authority to do
so. Alternatively, the missing judge may be replaced, but the
replacement judge must also be authorized. This Article describes,
evaluates, and ultimately questions this prevailing approach. It does
not challenge the statutory basis for the prevailing approach, but
argues that the patchwork of statutes, rules and judicial practice
governing cases of panel irregularity is flawed and in need of
modification. In particular, the permissive attitude toward quorums is
difficult to square with the categorically restrictive attitude toward
panels with unauthorized members. In both cases, a decision is being
reached by a panel that includes only two authorized members.
The proposed solution is harmonization – full, authorized
panels in every case. In terms of practical effect, this means
abandoning quorum decisions in the federal appellate courts. To
arrive at this conclusion, Part I begins by more fully describing the
current approach toward irregular panels, drawing from statutes and
case law. Part II turns to the functional considerations implicated by
irregular panels. Drawing on recent work by Frank Cross, Cass
Sunstein and others on the nature of judicial deliberation, I suggest a
variety of process-level benefits that accompany the participation of
three judges in the appellate decision-making process. Even when two
assigned judges agree, a third judge may make contributions along
several dimensions. Most dramatically, the injection of a new voice
may trigger shifts in the direction of the opinion reached. More
commonly, the third judge may affect the terms and status of the
opinion. For example, the third judge may write a dissent, prompting
revisions to the majority opinion and affecting the way that the
opinion is interpreted and applied in future cases. Alternatively, the
third judge may use the threat of a dissent to extract modifications to
the terms of the opinion, or may simply perform an error-correcting
and nuance-enhancing role in the development of an opinion with
which she generally agrees. In all cases, the presence of a full panel
should produce additional benefits in terms of legitimacy and
acceptance by the parties subject to the opinion.
While this menu of benefits does not come without costs, they
should not be overstated. Preserving the ability for the institution to
function, which is perhaps the most traditional rationale for quorum
authority, is not compelling in the context of the modern federal
appellate courts; the pool of judges from which to form complete
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panels is sufficiently large in every circuit that the set of cases for
which a three-judge panel could not be convened is null. And
arguments rooted in the futility of adding a third judge are convincing
only if we accept a static view of the decision-making process that is
simplistic at best. Rather, the genuine costs come in terms of
efficiency and expediency. Adding a third judge requires an
expenditure of judicial resources, and may slow the decision-making
process. The judicial system – and, in some cases, perhaps the parties
themselves – may be willing to make do without the benefits just
described when these costs are particularly acute.
We might conclude from this that panel irregularities should be
permitted when the gains in terms of expediency and efficiency
outweigh the losses in terms of the decisional dynamics described
above. But Part III suggests that any attempt to perform this sort of
balancing is problematic. In theory, at least, the current approach
toward quorums permits calibration of this sort. Although two judges
are permitted to proceed as a quorum in certain circumstances, they
are never required to do so. Two judges could therefore decide to seek
the assignment of a third judge in any case where the potential
contribution of that judge would outweigh the cost and delay of
securing that contribution. Theoretical possibilities aside, the current
procedural mechanism is unlikely to accurately perform this kind of
calibration in practice because judges who are themselves involved in
the decision will systematically overestimate the expediency and
efficiency costs and underestimate the process-level benefits.
To counter these biases, Part III examines three procedural
modifications to the prevailing approach. The first two – enhanced
self-assessment and external review – preserve the option of decision
by irregular panel, but attempt to improve the selection of cases where
that option is used. These two approaches roughly mirror competing
improvements that have been suggested in the context of judicial
recusal and misconduct. A third option, which has not been widely
considered in those contexts, is to eliminate the decision altogether
and to require the participation of three valid judges in all cases.
Removing discretion is ultimately the preferred approach to irregular
panels, both because it produces a more desirable set of outcomes at a
lower cost than the competing options and because it unifies the
treatment of the competing categories of panel irregularity.
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THE LAW OF IRREGULAR PANELS

The current approach toward irregular panels reflects the inputs
of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the courts of appeals themselves.
Congress has supplied the basic statutory framework for appellate
panel composition, which combines a firm requirement that three
judges must constitute a panel with a permissive provision that
authorizes two judges to act as a quorum of any panel.8 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly enforced the statutory restrictions on panel
constitution, and in doing so has declined to view the quorum
provision as sufficiently broad to authorize actions by two judges who
were not once part of a properly constituted panel.9 But that is the
only limit to the quorum provision at which the Court has hinted, and
the courts of appeals have not been eager to impose any additional
limits as a matter of statutory command.10 Instead, the appellate
courts have consistently rebuffed challenges to quorum decisions by
referencing the broad authority provided by statute. The end result is a
technical approach that views the statutory requirements narrowly.11
A.

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 46 governs the composition of appellate panels.
Section 46(b) provides: “In each circuit the court may authorize the
hearing and determination of cases and controversies by separate
panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a majority of whom
shall be judges of that court . . . .” Although this seems to embody a
firm requirement that three judges are necessary to constitute a panel,
two subsequent provisions soften that requirement substantially.
Section 46(c), which primarily describes the en banc process for
courts, begins by noting that “[c]ases and controversies shall be heard
8

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.1.
10
See infra Part I.B.2.
11
This does not mean that the courts of appeals have been completely unwilling
to place limits on decisions by irregular panels. To the contrary, many have adopted
local rules and procedures that authorize quorum decisions in a smaller class of cases
than the statute would otherwise permit. Those local rules and procedures are
discussed infra at Part III.A. The point here is that neither the Supreme Court nor
the courts of appeals have imposed any restrictions on the basis of the statutory
language of 28 U.S.C. § 46.
9
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and determined by a court or panel of not more than three judges.”12
More importantly, Section 46(d) allows that “[a] majority of the
number of judges authorized to constitute a court or panel thereof, as
provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum.”13
Much of the language in Section 46(b) was added as part of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, and the Senate Report
accompanying that Act is similarly equivocal about the necessity of
three-judge panels. In two places, the report emphasizes the
importance of deciding cases with three judges. For example, in the
Explanation of the Bill, the Report provides:
Current law seems to permit appellate courts to sit in
panels of less than three judges, and some courts have
used panels of two judges for motions and for
disposition of cases in which no oral argument is
permitted because the case is classified as insubstantial.
In order for the Federal system to perserve [sic] both
the appearance and the reality of justice, such a practice
should not become institutionalized. The disposition of
an appeal should be the collective product of at least
three minds.14
But the Act did not remove Section 46(d)’s quorum provision, and that
alone weakens the force of the Report’s rhetoric.15 That force is
further diminished by the inclusion – merely two sentences after the
excerpt just quoted – of the following sentence:
The circuit courts could continue to adopt local rules
permitting the disposition of an appeal in situations in
12

28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
14
S. Rep. 97-275 at 19. Later, in the Section-By-Section Analysis, the Report
repeats that initial refrain and adds:
Because of apprehensions that decisions at the appellate level by fewer than
three judges carry the risk of being less sound or less balanced, there is
widespread belief that every decision of an appeal should be the collective
product of at least three minds. Subsection (b) of section 204 also amends
28 U.S.C. § 46(b) to require that all decisions be reached by at least three
judges. Id. at 37.
15
The 1982 Act did not simply ignore or overlook the quorum provision,
however. Section 46(d) was amended slightly (replacing “division” with “panel”) to
bring its language in line with changes in other subsections.
13
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which one of the three judges dies or becomes disabled
and the remaining two agree on the disposition; but, in
the first instance, all cases would be assigned to panel
[sic] of at least three judges.16
This concession, together with the existing presence of the
quorum provision in the statutory framework, dramatically undercuts
the earlier forceful language directed at Section 46(b). The earlier
language appears to embody a desire to introduce a firm decision rule
that would require the involvement of three judges in the ultimate
disposition of every appeal. The result instead is a formation rule that
– notwithstanding the aspirations of the Act’s title – merely reconfirms
the prevailing view of the courts. In practice, the Act has produced no
discernable shift in the judicial approach toward statutory panel
requirements; as the next section demonstrates, that approach has
consistently been to scrutinize initial composition of panels while
brushing aside challenges to the decisional authority of two-judge
quorums.
B.

Cases
1.

Supreme Court

When assessing challenges to panel composition, the Court has
held that appellate panels must have authority to act as granted by
statute. This requires at least that the appeal be assigned initially to a
three-judge panel composed of “competent” judges. Most challenges
to panel composition have been based on a failure to meet this initial
requirement. The law here has essentially been settled for as long as
the circuit courts have existed. Merely two years after their creation,17
the Supreme Court in American Construction v. Jacksonville18
considered the legitimacy of an appellate panel that included a judge
who had heard part of the case below.19 The Court returned the case
16

Id. at 19.
Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly known as the
Evarts Act).
18
18 S.Ct. 758 (1893).
19
The appeal in American Construction stemmed from the reversal of the
questionable judge’s order by a different district judge. This arrangement conflicted
rather plainly with Section 3 of the Judiciary Act of 1891, which provided that no
judge should sit on the appellate panel to review “a cause or question” that had been
17
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and directed that a writ of certiorari would be granted for the purpose
of quashing the decree of the appellate court in the event that the judge
were not disqualified. Underlying that disposition was a conclusion
that “the decree in which [the district judge] took part was unlawful,
and perhaps absolutely void, and should certainly be set aside or
quashed by any court having authority to review it by appeal, error, or
certiorari.”20 In short, if the panel was not properly constituted, it had
no authority to act.21
Much more recently, the Court in Nguyen v. United States22
considered the presence of a non-Article III judge on an appellate
panel. When the Ninth Circuit held a special session in Guam, it
invited a district judge from the Northern Mariana Islands to sit by
designation.23 Although he did not complain at the time, the criminal
defendant Nguyen later noted that the District Court for the Northern
tried or heard before him at the trial level. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26
Stat. 826, 827 (1891).
20
18 S.Ct. at 764.
21
This view was reaffirmed twenty years later in William Cramp & Sons v. Int’l
Curtis Marine, 228 U.S. 645 (1913). There, as in American Construction, the judge
assigned the case below was included in the appellate panel. Even so, the judge in
Wm. Cramp asserted that Section 3 of the Judiciary Act was not implicated because
the appellate panel was not reviewing any decision that he had made. This argument
was possible only because the judge had not made any decisions with respect to the
case; instead, he had declared himself too busy to examine its merits, and had
entered a pro forma decree for the purpose of passing the case directly to the
appellate court.
Id. at 647-50. Unimpressed, the Court concluded that,
notwithstanding “the sense of public duty which led the trial court virtually to
decline to examine the merits of the case,” id. at 648, an error had indeed been
committed – namely, that “the circuit court of appeals which passed upon the case
was virtually no court at all, because not organized in conformity to law.” Id. at 652.
22
539 U.S. 69 (2003). Nguyen was not the Court’s first encounter with nonArticle III judges in federal appellate decision-making. Forty years earlier, the Court
decided Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), which challenged the authority
of a three-judge Second Circuit panel that included a judge sitting by designation
from the Court of Claims. Unlike William Cramp and American Construction, the
challenge raised in Glidden was constitutional rather than statutory: petitioners
claimed that the structural protections of Article III were lacking in their case
because the Court of Claims judge had only Article I status. Id. at 532-34. In an
excruciatingly long opinion, Justice Harlan concluded for the plurality of the Court
that judges sitting on the Court of Claims have Article III status, and that the panel
was therefore constitutionally unproblematic. In Nguyen, Justice Stevens explicitly
declined to rest his opinion on the structural guarantees of the Constitution, and
instead focused on the panel’s lack of statutory authority. 539 U.S. at 76 n.9.
23
Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 73.
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Mariana Islands is an Article IV territorial court, and he claimed that
judges from that court are not permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) to
sit by designation on appellate panels. As it turns out, no one involved
in the case at the Supreme Court disputed that claim; all nine justices –
and even both parties – agreed that the Article IV judge was not
statutorily authorized to sit.24 A slim majority further agreed that
American Construction and its progeny required the conclusion that
the panel’s lack of authority rendered it incompetent to act.25
Implicit in this approach to questions of panel legitimacy is
that the existence of a competent quorum provides no defense to the
improper constitution of an appellate panel. Indeed, Nguyen was
explicit on this point. The remaining two judges on the Ninth Circuit
panel had undeniable Article III status, and the government argued
that those two judges could enter judgment as a quorum even though
the third judge was concededly incompetent to sit. The Court rejected
that argument outright. It first noted that it “has never doubted its
power to vacate the judgment entered by an improperly constituted
court of appeals, even when there was a quorum of judges competent
to consider the appeal.”26 In this case, the panel was improperly
constituted because 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) requires the presence of three
competent judges “in the first instance.”27 Although “the two Article
III judges who took part in the decision of petitioners’ appeals would
24

Id. at 80-81 (“Even if the parties had expressly stipulated to the participation
of a non-Article III judge in the consideration of their appeals, no matter how
distinguished and well qualified the judge might be, such a stipulation would not
have cured the plain defect in the composition of the panel”). See also, id. at 84
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“It was undoubtedly a mistake, for the reasons stated
by the Court, . . . for the appellate panel to include an Article III judge.”).
25
This question produced a bizarre 5-4 split in Nguyen. Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas followed the approach taken in American
Construction and viewed the lack of authority as an error that rendered the panel
incompetent to act. Id. at 83 n.17. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices
Scalia, Breyer and Ginsburg, would have instead responded to the petitioner’s failure
to raise his challenge in the Ninth Circuit itself by applying a plain error review
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), and thus would have affirmed the
panel’s unanimous decision despite the statutory infirmity. Id. at 84.
Nguyen’s split may suggest that the Court’s view is in transition and that plainerror review will eventually carry the day. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s more recent
opinion in Gonzales v. United States, 553 U.S. at ___ (May 12, 2008), supports this
possibility. As it stands, however, statutory authority remains strictly necessary to
provide an appellate panel with the power to act.
26
Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 82.
27
Id.
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have constituted a quorum if the original panel had been properly
created,”28 they did not constitute a quorum of the panel in Nguyen
because there was in effect no panel at all.
Thus, Nguyen concludes that the existence of the quorum
statute is not enough to cure a deficiency in the panel’s creation. But
in the absence of such a deficiency, the Court had no problem
describing as “settled law” that a quorum of two judges may “proceed
to judgment when one member of the panel dies or is disqualified.”29
That view echoes the Court’s earlier passing treatment of the quorum
question in the slightly different context presented by Ayrshire
Collieries Corp. v. United States.30 Ayrshire held that a decision by
two judges of a three judge panel constituted under the Urgent
Deficiencies Act was invalid. To reach that result, the Court relied
heavily on the language of the Act, which provided that interlocutory
injunctions challenging orders by the Interstate Commerce
Commission “shall be heard and determined by three judges.”31
Although the same provision called for a majority voting rule, such
that the vote of two judges was sufficient to grant the injunction, the
Act contained no quorum provision that would permit only two judges
to take part in the vote.32 The absence of a quorum provision was read
against the parallel statute dealing with three-judge circuit courts of
appeals, where the Court noted that two judges “ordinarily constitute a
statutory quorum for the hearing and determination of cases.”33
2.

The Courts of Appeals

The courts of appeals have echoed the Supreme Court’s
permissive attitude toward the power of two judges to render appellate
judgments once the panel’s initial authority has been established.
Most opinions reached by two judges are explained and justified
without any substantive discussion of the panel’s status as a quorum.
Instead, a footnote is included at the beginning of the opinion that

28

Id. at 83.
Id. at 82.
30
331 U.S. 132 (1947).
31
Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1947).
32
331 U.S. at 138 (“It is significant that this Act makes no provision for a
quorum of less than three judges.”).
33
Id.
29
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simply cites to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) or the court’s local rule.34 But even
when a quorum addresses its status, the treatment is often quite
cursory. For example, in United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp.35 –
the case cited by Nguyen to establish the acceptability of quorum
decisions as “settled law”36 – Judge Hand noted that Judge Frank filed
a memorandum of his conclusions with respect to the case two days
before his death, and that those conclusions led him to “vote to affirm”
despite “some doubt” as to one point. He then rejected any challenge
to the two-judge decision in just two sentences: “[E]ven when a judge
has resigned after argument, or has died after expressing his dissent, a
remaining majority has jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal. A fortiori
is this true when one judge has died after expressing his concurrence
in the disposal adopted by the majority.”37
Since the passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act in
1982, with its intermittent emphasis of the value of three-judge
decision making,38 various courts have had occasion to revisit (or visit
for the first time) the propriety of two-judge decisions. Despite the
legislative intervention, the result has been essentially unchanged:
34

For examples, see Pratt v. U.S., 340 F.2d 174, 176 (1st Cir. 1964); In re
Enron Corp., 475 F.3d 131 (2d. Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Morris, No. 04-3050, 2005 WL
2323131, at *505 (3d. Cir. Sept. 23, 2005); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Roberson,
918 F.2d 1144, 1146 (4th Cir. 1990); O’Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 477
F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2007); Cambio Health Solutions, LLC v. Reardon, Nos. 04-6485,
05-5041, 2007 WL 627834, at *333 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2007); Picco v. General Elec.
Co., No. 04-1489, 2004 WL 2486631, at *227 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 2004); Kulinski v.
Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 108 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Wardwell,
No. 94-1161, 1995 WL 330756, at *5 (10th Cir. May 25, 1995); U.S. v. Russo, 717
F.2d 545, 547 (11th Cir. 1983); Gandal v. Telemundo Group, Inc., 23 F.3d 539, 541
(D.C. Cir. 1994). Older cases instead attached a note at the end of the opinion, but
to the same effect. See, for example, Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 19 F.2d 766
(2d Cir. 1927) (“The late Circuit Judge HOUGH did not see this opinion. He
dissented from the conclusion, and thought the order should be affirmed.”).
35
241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1957).
36
Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 82.
37
Allied Stevedoring, 241 F.2d at 927. More cursory still was the Fourth
Circuit’s response to a challenge raised by a litigant to a two-judge decision:
“[O]nly two judges heard the appeal because the third judge who was assigned to the
case and had theretofore participated in one of the preliminary hearings – Judge
Soper – was ill on the day of argument. He did not take part in the subsequent
conferences on the case and died before its decision.” U.S. v. Mills, 317 F.2d 764
(4th Cir. 1963). This is better characterized as a description of events than as a
substantive legal argument.
38
For further discussion of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, see
supra discussion accompanying notes 14-16.
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when challenged, courts have embraced a permissive attitude toward
two-judge decisions justified largely by reference to the continuing
existence of the quorum provision in 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
In particular, the Second Circuit has issued a trilogy of
opinions dealing with various permutations of quorum decisionmaking, each defending the practice. In Murray v. National
Broadcasting Company,39 the court responded to a motion for
rehearing filed when a panel member recused himself immediately
preceding oral argument and the remaining two judges decided the
case. While recognizing and indeed referencing the Senate Report
accompanying the 1982 modifications, Judge Newman ultimately
concluded that they were intended only to ensure “that the appeal must
be assigned ‘in the first instance’ to a panel of three judges.”40
Two subsequent cases went further. The first challenged the
decision of a two-judge panel because the recused judge participated
in oral argument while one of the remaining two judges did not.41 The
court concluded that “[a] recused judge’s participation during oral
argument does not constitute the sort of participation in the
deliberative process that might impair the validity of a judgment,”42
and that a “judge’s absence [from oral argument], at most, deprives the
lawyers of the ‘opportunity’ to have the judge ask them questions,
surely not a protected right.”43 Just months later, the court held that a
two-judge panel consisting of one Second Circuit judge and one sitting
by designation could decide an appeal by quorum.44 This challenge to
the panel’s authority was rooted in the requirement, found in 28
39

35 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 47. (“[T]he legislative history makes clear that the statute was not
intended to preclude disposition by a panel of two judges in the even that one
member of a three-judge panel to which the appeal is assigned becomes unable to
participate.”).
41
Whitehall Tenants Corp. v. Whitehall Realty Co., 136 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1998).
42
Id. at 232-33.
43
Id. at 233. Interestingly, in Whitehall – unlike in Murray – the two-judge
quorum requested the appointment of a third judge for the purpose of considering the
motion for rehearing (raising the challenge to the two-judge panel). Id. at 232 (citing
the “nature of the issues presented by the rehearing petition”).
44
United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 1998). As in Whitehall, the
third judge in Desimone became unavailable only after participating in oral
argument, but that aspect of the quorum decision was not challenged. Also as in
Whitehall, the two-judge quorum requested that a third judge be designated to help
decide the motion for rehearing. On this occasion, Chief Judge Winter designated
himself, and then wrote the opinion supporting the quorum’s authority.
40
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U.S.C. § 46(b), that a panel must consist of three judges, “the majority
of whom shall be judges of that court.” Appellants argued that when
the “panel” was reduced to two judges, the effect of the provision was
to require that the majority of the two remaining judges (i.e., both) be
“judges of that court.”45 As the Supreme Court would do five years
later in Nguyen, the Second Circuit here emphasized the importance of
initial composition, only this time to dispose of the challenge: The “of
that court” language in 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) applies only to the original
authority of a panel,46 and once authorized, any majority constitutes a
quorum under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).47

45

Id. at 458.
Id.at 459 (“Section 46(b) requires only that a three-judge panel . . . have two
members of the court on it when ‘authorized.’”).
47
Id. at 458-59 (“Section 46(d) . . . requires only that [the quorum] be a majority
of a legally authorized panel.”). The Second Circuit is not alone in going to great
lengths to permit quorum decisions. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
has repeatedly upheld decisions reached by only two judges of a panel of the Court
of Criminal Appeals, even though no clear statutory authority supports those
decisions. 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) provides for the establishment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, “which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such
panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges.” Unlike 28
U.S.C. § 46(d) in the civilian context or 10 U.S.C. § 944 in the military context, no
accompanying provision authorizes a quorum.
To overcome the absence of specific statutory authority, the Judge Advocates
General used the authority provided by 10 U.S.C. § 866(f) to “prescribe uniform
rules of procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals” to promulgate Local Rule 4(a),
which provides that “a majority of the judges assigned to [a] panel constitutes a
quorum for the purpose of hearing or determining any matter referred to the panel.”
44 M.J. at LXV. On various occasions since 1955, see United States v. PetroffTachomakoff, 5 USCMA 824 (1955); United States v. Hurt, 9 USMCA 735, 755
(1958); United States v. Parker, 22 USMCA 358, 360 (1973), and most recently in
2000, United States v. Lee, 54 M.J. 285 (2000), the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces has rejected challenges to decisions reached under that rule. Most notably,
the court in doing so has been willing to overlook what it concedes as “sound policy
reasons for requiring three judges to participate in every decision,” Lee, 54 M.J. at
287, because no legal authority strictly requires the result. Id.
But not every two-judge decision has been upheld. In United States v. Elliott, 15
M.J. 347 (1983), the court rejected a decision by a two-judge panel of the Navy
Marine Corps Court of Military Review because the third judge “was absent on leave
when he was detailed to the panel, had not been sworn in as an appellate military
judge, and was still absent on leave when the case was decided.” Lee, 54 M.J. at 287
(describing Elliott). Thus, even in the absence of statutory guidance, the court has
created a parallel framework: initial formation of the panel must follow strict
requirements, but decisions by less than the original number are permitted.
46
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II. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF IRREGULAR PANELS
The technical approach to panel formation and composition
described in Part I is defensible as a matter of statutory text. But it
produces results that are questionable at a functional level. Consider
the procedural development of two hypothetical appeals. In the first,
only two judges are appointed to sit on the panel; in the second, three
are appointed, but one dies immediately following the appointment.
As a functional matter, these two cases are difficult to distinguish. If
allowed to proceed, both will result in an appeal that is considered and
decided by a panel of two judges rather than the traditional three. But
because formation is all under the statutory framework, the slight
difference between the appeals leads to dramatic differences in their
treatment. The first fails to satisfy the 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) composition
requirement, and Nguyen attaches to that failure a mandatory reversal
of any action taken by the two-judge panel. As for the second, it
clears the 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) hurdle, and 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) then kicks
in to authorize all actions taken by the two-judge panel – up to and
including decision and disposition of the appeal on the merits. One
problem with the technical approach, therefore, is that it leads to
dramatic distinctions based on functionally insignificant differences.
More importantly, it is questionable whether the technical
approach accurately reflects the intuitions underlying the decisions
reached. Take Nguyen. Although Justice Stevens repeatedly
emphasized the statutory importance of initial assignment to a panel of
three judges,48 and although he explicitly concluded that the
justification for automatic reversal is that the assignment failure left
the panel without power to act,49 those considerations alone do not
neatly explain the result. To see this, we can think about the likely
outcome in Nguyen had the Article IV judge been assigned to the
panel only after the recusal of an original Article III judge. On these
facts, the initial formation problem leaned on by Justice Stevens in
Nguyen itself is absent – a properly constituted panel was assigned the
appeal, and a quorum of judges of that panel remained to decide it.
It is hard to imagine that these changed facts would trigger a
changed result. Nguyen stops short of reaching the question explicitly,
48

Nguyen, 539 U.S. 69, 82-83 (2003) (“The statutory authority for courts of
appeals to sit in panels, 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), requires the inclusion of at least three
judges in the first instance”).
49
Id. at 78, 83.
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expressing only that it is “less clear whether the quorum statute offers
postjudgment absolution for the participation of a judge who was not
otherwise competent to be part of the panel under §292(a).”50 But the
opinion contains multiple gestures in that direction. Justice Stevens
discarded a defense based on the de facto officer doctrine by
distinguishing between situations where the judge in question could
have exercised authority if certain procedures had been followed,51
and situations where an action “could never have been taken at all.”52
His descriptions of previous cases emphasized that the judges in
question lacked the statutory authority to “tak[e] part in the hearing
and decision of the appeal,”53 and he repeatedly mentioned their lack
of authority to “participate” in the appeal.54 Finally, his conclusion
about the seriousness of the error is based on an interpretation that
Congress intended to “preserve the Article III character of the courts
of appeals,”55 and that this intent reflects a “strong policy concerning
the proper administration of judicial business.”56
Ultimately, one is left with a sense that in Nguyen – as in the
other cases in the same line – the strict statutory defect is being used as
an easy and technical route to justify a more complex and functional
result. The real problem is less about assignment and initial authority,
and more about participation and the dynamics of judicial decisionmaking. If that intuition is correct, it sets up an interesting tension
when placed alongside the quorum cases: the presence of an
unauthorized third judge is problematic, but the absence of a third
judge altogether is not. This tension is not statutorily compelled,57 but
instead reflects an implicit judgment about the relative dangers of the
competing situations.
50

Id. at 83.
Id. at 77-79 (discussing McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 601-02
(1895) and Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 128-29 (1891)).
52
Id. at 79.
53
Id. at 76.
54
Id. at 69, 80.
55
Id. at 80.
56
Id. at 78, 81 (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536
(1962)(plurality opinion)). In Gonzales v. United States, 531 U.S. ___, Justice
Thomas alone concluded that the involvement of a magistrate judge in jury selection
involved a similar intent and policy.
57
The quorum provision might be read broadly to permit “postjudgment
absolution” in cases where an unauthorized judge is present but the decision is
supported by a valid quorum. See Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 83.
51
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This Part questions that implicit judgment. When viewed
functionally, there is little reason to treat instances of absent third
judges differently from instances of improper third judges. In the
former situation, the contribution of the proper third judge is missing;
in the latter, that contribution is missing and is replaced with an
invalid one. Perhaps at first glance this supports the intuition that
cases involving improper judges are more troublesome. But the
absence of a contribution may be more significant than the presence of
an improper contribution in many cases, and ultimately it is difficult to
make categorical conclusions. Instead, both deviations from the
standard decision-making paradigm produce skewed decisional
dynamics that are difficult to distinguish – and difficult to justify.
A.

Decisional Dynamics and Irregular Panels

Decisions by full panels of three members differ materially
from those rendered by quorums of two or by panels with an improper
third member. In all three cases, the votes of two legitimate panel
members are arguably enough to constitute a majority. But the
appellate system is not designed merely to aggregate votes – rather,
the design is to create a dynamic interaction of judicial views. Thus,
while two votes are enough to decide an appeal, the context of those
two votes is important. This section considers the various ways that
departures from the standard practice produce changes at the level of
decisional direction and content. Requiring the involvement of a
proper third judge – even when two proper judges are involved and in
agreement – may lead to shifts in the direction of the appeal’s
disposition in cases where persuasion by the third judge dislodges the
tentatively held position of one or more existing panel members.
More frequently, involvement by a proper third judge will generate
modification in the terms of the final decision as well as improvement
of its legitimacy.
1.

Changing the direction of the opinion

Suppose that a third judge is added to an existing group of two
and disagrees with the tentative disposition of the case. This judge –
whom I will refer to here as a “doubtful judge” – might perform a very
dramatic role: she may alter the direction of the final decision. Of
course, given the majority voting rule, the doubtful judge cannot
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perform this role alone; if the other two judges continue to view the
case differently, the direction of the vote will be unchanged. But in
certain cases, at least, she might accomplish this result by persuading
one or both of the other judges to reconsider their view.
Persuasion is possible in the appellate process because
decisional norms allow judges to play the role of internal
whistleblower.58 In other decision-making contexts, majority view
holders can simply ignore the opposing views held by others, and that
ability greatly diminishes the persuasive capacity of minority view
holders.59 But “[t]he social etiquette of the [appellate] court requires
that the majority listen to the minority judge.”60 As a result of this
“norm of attention,” a doubtful third judge can make arguments that
the other two judges must consider, and that consideration will
occasionally lead to revision of opinion.61 Ultimately, directional
revision stemming from persuasion might occur when the doubtful
judge corrects an error made by the other two judges, or when the
doubtful judge makes legal arguments to counter ideologically
motivated conclusions reached by the other two judges.62
The possibility of persuasion highlights the potential for
dynamics in the appellate decisional process. Static accounts of the
process fail because the fact that two judges agree at time A is not
determinative; one or both of those judges may vote differently at time
B. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that persuasion of this sort
occurs with some frequency in appellate decision making. For
example, Justice Ginsburg recently celebrated the value of dissent by
noting that “[o]n rare occasions, a dissent will be so persuasive that it
58

See FRANK CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 155
(2007).
59
See, e.g. Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation
Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L.REV. 216, 216-217 (2006)
(describing the tendencies for majority shareholders to favor their own interests and
ignore minority shareholders' concerns in closely held corporations); Emily White,
“Not Our Problem:” Construction Trade Unions and Hostile Environment
Discrimination, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 245, 275 (2006) (describing workplace unions
ignoring issues and concerns of the minority of their constituents in favor of the
majority of their current members).
60
CROSS, supra note 58 at 154.
61
Id. (“The minority may expose the majority’s underlying, unconscious biases
and force the majority to confront the conflict and potentially resolve it in the
minority’s favor.”).
62
On this latter point, “panel minorities can use procedural legal arguments to
counter the ideologically motivated reasoning of the panel majority.” Id. at 174.
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attracts the votes necessary to become the opinion of the Court. I had
the heady experience once of writing a dissent for myself and just one
other Justice that became the opinion of the Court from which only
two of my colleagues, in the end, dissented.”63
The dynamics of persuasion undermine both quorum decisions
and decisions by irregular panels. In an irregular panel, the
participation of an illegitimate third judge may result in a decision that
is different in terms of direction than would be a decision reached by
the same two judges alone or in concert with a legitimate third judge.
That is, the undue influence of the illegitimate judge is not limited to
the vote that she casts; it extends to the votes of the remaining judges
as well. Thus, participation by an illegitimate judge cannot be cured
merely by counting the votes of the putative quorum – once the
illegitimate third judge is part of the process, the other votes become
illegitimate as well. Similarly, when a quorum of two decides in the
absence of a third judge, their votes fail to reflect the potential
influence of a doubtful third judge. Indeed, it may well be that the
difference between actual and prospective voting is greater in this
latter context. A putative quorum may be influenced less by an
improper third judge than by a newly added – and proper – third judge
because the “norm of attention” may be stronger with respect to proper
judges.64 Put differently, what might be gained by replacing an absent
third judge may be greater than what is lost by permitting an
illegitimate third judge to participate.

63

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “The Role of Dissenting Opinions,” Eizenstat
Memorial
Lecture
(October
21,
2007).
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_10-21-07.html
See
generally, Rick A. Swanson, Judicial Perceptions of Voting Fluidity on State
Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 199 (2007) (discussing survey results of state
supreme courts as to how judges opinions and case outcome votes are influenced and
affected by arguments and opinions of other judges).
64
Michael Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal? An Examination of the Use of
District Court Judges Sitting By Designation on the United States Courts of Appeal,
28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351, 379 (1995) (“District judges are perceived by some to
have lower status or prestige than circuit judges and typically will have less acumen
regarding appellate practice. These factors suggest that district judges sitting by
designation will have less influence and less independence of judgment.”). See also
Paul M. Collins, Jr. and Wendy L. Martinek, The Small Group Context: Designated
District Court Judges in the United States Courts of Appeals, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120957 (posted April 22,
2008).
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Changing the terms of the opinion

The best persuasive efforts of a doubtful third judge will not be
enough to generate a vote shift in most cases. But that does not mean
that the effect of the third judge is reduced to zero in those cases. The
outcome of an appeal is more than the simple direction of the vote
reached; it is also the terms of the opinion written to justify that
direction, and a third judge – doubtful or not – is likely to exercise
some influence in that domain of the decisional process.
The most direct way to influence the terms of the opinion
reached is for the doubtful judge to contribute a dissent. In some
circumstances, the result of this external whistle-blowing65 may affect
the outcome of the particular appeal at issue. This would occur if the
existence of the dissent effectively triggers Supreme Court review, and
if the Supreme Court ultimately embraces the view expressed by the
doubtful judge. As an empirical matter, the existence of a dissent
makes Supreme Court review of an appellate decision more likely,66
and so the proposition that the addition of the doubtful judge’s dissent
might make a difference in certiorari terms is not entirely far-fetched.
Even so, this type of influence is almost certainly very rare because
the likelihood of Supreme Court review remains quite small even
when dissents are present.
Much more likely is that the doubtful judge’s dissent affects
the future treatment of the case in precedential terms. This influence
may take two forms. First, the dissent may weaken the case’s
precedential value by decreasing the willingness of future courts to
cite it as support, or by increasing the willingness of future courts to
voice criticisms. Second, the dissent may lay the groundwork for a
later reversal of the precedent by another panel or by the court as a
whole. Again, recent empirical study by Frank Cross provides some
support for both forms of influence. Cross concludes that “cases with
65

Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller have characterized dissents as external
whistle-blowing. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship
and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2173-74 (“The presence of a politically opposed minority
representative means that there is someone on the panel who can identify the
majority's disobedience to doctrine.”).
66
See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of
Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2006), for a
discussion on how dissenting opinions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals increase the
likelihood for the U.S. Supreme Court to grant review.
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dissents are associated with a higher rate of negative treatment and
much higher rate of reversals.”67 The finding with respect to the first
form of influence is mitigated by a related finding that “opinions with
dissents also had a significantly higher number of positive citations,”68
a result likely explained by the fact that “dissents tend to occur in the
most salient cases, those that are the most likely to produce future
citations, whether positive or negative.”69 This mixed finding aside,
the general result is that the existence of a dissent influences the
treatment of an appeal as precedent. For present purposes, the precise
contours of that influence are not important; what matters is that the
third judge is performing a role that is meaningful and relevant despite
its futility in strict directional terms.70
The options available to a doubtful judge are not limited to
shifting votes or filing dissents. The doubtful judge can also vote with
the two other judges, but extract changes to the terms of the opinion in
exchange for that vote.71 The remaining two judges will often agree to
67

CROSS, supra note 58 at 222.
Id. at 223.
69
Id.
70
See, William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
430 (1986) (“In its most straightforward incarnation, the dissent demonstrates flaws
the author perceives in the majority's legal analysis.… But the dissent is often more
than just a plea; it safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-making process by
keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its
decision.”); Robert G. Flanders, Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions In
Appellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS
U.L. REV. 401, 406 (1999) (“First and foremost, a dissenting opinion serves the
interests of the truth. If an appellate bench is not of one mind, then the filing of
separate opinions by those judges who disagree with the majority point of view is the
only truthful way to reflect the court's actual disparate opinions on the matters before
it.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133,
143 (1990) (“Most immediately, when drafted and circulated among the judges,
[dissents] may provoke clarifications, refinements, modifications in the court's
opinion…Separate opinions in intermediate appellate courts serve an alert
function.”); Ginsburg, supra note 63 (“My experience teaches that there is nothing
better than an impressive dissent to improve an opinion for the Court. A well
reasoned dissent will lead the author of the majority opinion to refine and clarify her
initial circulation.”); Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of
the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 Geo. L.J. 2069, 2082 (1995) (“Dissents serve a
number of positive functions. They improve judicial decisions, guide future
interpretation of the law, and give substantive expression to the First Amendment
ideal of free speech for disfavored groups and minorities.”).
71
Similarly, changes in the terms of the controlling opinion may occur when the
doubtful judge issues a dissent. Often the content of that dissent will provoke a
68
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make changes in response to a threatened dissent because they want to
be able to issue the opinion unanimously.72 Unanimity may be valued
either as a means of promoting the court’s legitimacy by “preserving
the image of the nonideological nature of decision making,”73 or as a
means of enhancing the future precedential value of the opinion. From
the doubtful judge’s perspective, a moderate change in the terms of a
unanimous opinion may be preferable to a more disagreeable majority
opinion accompanied by a dissent because the latter requires a
significant investment of effort74 and has uncertain long-term results.75
As a result, the addition of the third judge will often lead to an opinion
that reaches the same outcome, but by different terms.
Opinion modification of this sort is very likely the modal form
of a doubtful judge’s influence.76 The expected direction of that
response from the majority, which may either strengthen or weaken the position
taken in the opinion. See CROSS, supra note 58 at 158-59 (“When a group contains
potential dissenters, or at least internal devil’s advocates, the minority position can
highlight the counterarguments to the majority position and its associated risks, thus
moderating the majority.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for
Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (2008).
72
See id.; CROSS, supra note 58 at 160 (suggesting that a norm of consensus
may lead to “some degree of majority conciliation, giving the minority something of
precedential value in the opinion, if not the actual desired outcome, to stave off a
dissenting opinion”).
73
Id. at 160. See also, Atkins & Green, “Consensus on the United States Courts
of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?”, 20 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 735, 736 (1976).
74
See CROSS, supra note 58 at 161 (“Under the circumstances, it is unsurprising
that circuit court judges seldom expend the resources to issue a dissenting opinion,
even when they ideologically disagree with the majority’s opinion.”).
75
That is, the long-term result of issuing the dissent may be preferable to
extracting the opinion modification if the dissent leads the case to be reversed by the
Supreme Court or criticized or overturned by a later opinion of the circuit court. But
if the dissent is essentially ignored and the majority opinion continues to be relied on
as precedent within the circuit, the judge may have been better off with a weakened
precedential opinion. At the time that the decision must be made, it is difficult for
the judge to know which of these possibilities will occur.
76
Despite this, negotiating for opinion modifications is a form of disagreement
that is not captured by studies of voting behavior. Id. at 164 (“The research here
cannot fully capture possible panel effects because it considers only case outcomes.
It is distinctly possible that panel minorities could influence the language of the
judicial opinion, even when it does not alter the outcome, and that the opinion could
be significant, but the data cannot capture this effect.”). In large part because of this
possibility, numerous commentators have noted that the rate of dissent may not be a
satisfactory measure of the frequency of disagreement in appellate decision making
because disagreement may lead to results other than dissent. Yet another form of
disagreement is silent acquiescence motivated by an economic decision that the
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influence should be toward more accurate and moderate results.
Almost by definition, the addition of a doubtful judge increases the
panel’s ideological diversity. Cass Sunstein, Frank Cross and others
have argued that ideologically diverse panels are desirable because
they are more likely to identify the correct outcome in cases where one
outcome is clearly preferable, and more likely to reach a moderate
outcome in cases where no clearly preferable outcome exists.77 Apart
from the actual effect, the addition of the doubtful judge may also lead
to improvement in the panel’s self-perception of and commitment to
the decision reached.78 This may be an independently valuable result.
Thus, the addition of a doubtful third judge may lead to an opinion that
is not just different, but one that is normatively preferable along
several dimensions.79
disagreement is not worth the candle. Both of these forms of disagreement have
implications for the burgeoning study of panel effects. See CROSS, supra note 58, at
161.
77
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 337–46 (2004). In cases where there is a clearly
correct outcome, “[t]he existence of diversity on a three-judge panel is likely to bring
that fact to light and to move the panel’s decision in the direction of what the law
actually requires. The existence of politically diverse judges, and of a potential
dissenter-whistleblower, increases the chance that the law will be followed.”
SUNSTEIN, supra at 185. See also Cross & Tiller, supra note 65, at 2172. In cases
where the correct outcome is less clear, we might also benefit from ideological
diversity, either because “through that route more (reasonable) opinions are likely to
be heard,”, or because the varying viewpoints will have a “moderating effect” that is
desirable in cases of genuine uncertainty. SUNSTEIN, supra at 186; see also CROSS,
supra note 58, at 155 (“The minority opinion could trigger the consideration in the
group’s analytical process of other alternatives that might provide a middle-ground
answer.”).
78
CROSS, supra note 58 at 159. See also D.M. Schweiger, et al., Group
Approaches for Improving Strategic Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of
Dialectic Inquiry, Devil’s Advocacy, and Consensus, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 51 (“The
group process may also be important in gaining commitment to and acceptance of
decisions among individuals who ultimately will be responsible for implementing
such decisions.”).
79
Many of these advantages will also be present if the doubtful third judge
issues a dissent. Studies of Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated that
majority opinions use more complex reasoning in cases involving a dissent. See
Deborah Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S.
Supreme Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 8 (1995) (“Membership in a majority, where
dissent exists, should be associated with divergent thinking and greater integrative
complexity than membership in either a unanimous group, in which divergent
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Modifying the terms of the appellate opinion is almost
certainly also the modal form of an agreeable judge’s influence. But
the direction of that influence is harder to predict. A third judge who
agrees wholeheartedly with the outcome supported by the initial two
judges may still contribute nuance to the opinion, encourage the
removal of problematic passages, and improve error correction. These
effects are normatively desirable, if neutral in direction. But an
undesirable effect is also possible: the addition of an agreeable third
judge may contribute to ideological amplification and lead to a more
extreme result. Ideological amplification,80 or consensual group
polarization,81 describes the process by which groups of like-minded
individuals reinforce and amplify each other’s judgments. When this
occurs, the result of deliberation is that “groups end up adopting a
more extreme version of their predeliberation tendencies.”82 Because
it stems from the interaction of similar views, the incidence and
severity of group polarization is sensitive to the number of decision
makers involved.83 Put differently, ideological amplification is more
likely on a panel of three like-minded judges than on a panel of two
such judges. For that reason, the addition of an agreeable judge to an
existing panel of two may lead to shifts in the outcome that are
thinking is unlikely to occur, or a minority, in which convergent thinking is likely to
dominate.”). This may reflect the fact that the majority opinion must engage and
think more carefully about a decision when disagreement is raised.
80
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 4, 166-67 (Harvard
University Press 2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9, 71, 75-76 (2006); Cass R.
Sunstein et al, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004).
81
CROSS, supra note 58 at 156.
82
Sunstein et al., supra note 80, at 340. See also CROSS, supra note 58 at 158
(“Research on group decision making has found that when the deliberators hold
similar biases, the deliberation process can exacerbate those biases rather than
moderating them.”). Sunstein suggests three explanations for the group polarization
phenomenon: (1) People inclined to a position will have that position reinforced and
head in a more extreme direction when all members of the group share a similar
initial position; (2) Members of a group seek the approval of the other members and
will air their opinion in a way favorable to the other members of the group; and (3)
The similarity of view points in a group lends confidence to an individual member’s
ideas and therefore enables a more confident assertion of extreme ideas. Id. at 341343. Cross adds a fourth: “Each individual’s particular doubts might be overcome
by the others’ confidence in the conclusion.” CROSS, supra note 58 at 157.
83
See Robert Baron, Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity 32 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 558 (1996).
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unwelcome: the terms of the opinion may become more extreme and
more focused on ideological preferences rather than legal
requirements.84
In sum, a doubtful judge may moderate extreme outcomes by
changing the terms of the opinion or by tempering its precedential
value through dissent. An agreeable judge may improve error
correction, but may also contribute to more extreme results due to
ideological amplification. Both of these sets of effects support the
proposition that a decision by a regular panel of three valid judges is
not functionally identical to either a decision by a quorum of two or a
full panel with an irregular member.85 This is true despite the fact that
the votes of the same two judges may sustain the decision in all three
situations. Put more generally, the selection of a procedural
framework for reaching decisions entails the selection of a set of
decisional dynamics generated by that framework (as well as
decisional outcomes generated by those dynamics). In the appellate
context, the framework is decision by three judges, and that selection
is at least implicitly premised on the conclusion that over the run of
cases, the interaction of three views will deliver the preferred balance
of accuracy and cost. Deviating from that framework produces
deviations in the functional dynamics of the decision-making process
that manifest in ways that may not be captured in the absolute
direction of the final vote. For that reason, equivalent voting does not
guarantee equivalent results.

84

The shift away from legal rationales and toward ideological ones stems from
the application of the psychological phenomenon of the “risky shift” in the context
of judicial decision making. Group decision making leads to riskier decisions
because other members of the group can mitigate self-doubt and share responsibility
for potential errors. See CROSS, supra note 58, at 158.
85
A decision reached by a quorum of two judges does not benefit from the
moderating contributions that a doubtful third judge would add, but may avoid the
negative effects that an agreeable third judge might create. Conversely, a decision
reached by an irregular panel may exhibit undue influences on the terms of the
opinion introduced by the illegitimate third member. Moreover, in both cases the
opinions may be expected to include more errors. In the quorum context, that is
attributable to the total absence of a third check on the analysis; in the irregular panel
context, that is attributable to deficiencies in the third check on the analysis due to
decreased competence or – more likely – to a diminished norm of attention.
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Enhancing the legitimacy of the decision

In a final set of cases, the third judge will agree entirely with
the direction and the terms of a proposed opinion reached by the
remaining two judges, or will disagree but go along to avoid
expending resources to voice the disagreement. In these cases, the
contribution of the third judge appears strictly formal because the final
resolution is identical to what would be reached without the judge’s
participation. At a superficial level, then, it is difficult to understand
why it would matter whether this judge is legitimate, illegitimate, or
absent.
But the reception of appellate decisions by parties and the
public at large are not determined solely by their content. Acceptance
and legitimacy are also responsive to process-level concerns that are
independent of substantive content.86 For example, survey data
suggest that appeals are often filed in response to perceived failures by
the lower court to listen and respond to arguments made by one or
both parties. Numerous commentators have similarly argued that
notions of legitimacy require that the judicial process be structured to
ensure that parties sense that they were treated fairly and that their
participation was regarded.87
It is in this domain that even a passive third judge adds value.
Parties who file an appeal in the federal system do so with the
knowledge and expectation that appeals are decided by panels
consisting of three judges. Decisions rendered by only two judges or
by a panel including an illegitimate member are likely to be viewed as
aberrational. In terms of legitimacy, there is little reason to think that
quorum decisions will be perceived differently than decisions by
irregular panels. In either case, parties will naturally compare the
decision to the standard practice and conclude on that basis that the
process provided their dispute was inadequate. Such a conclusion will
in many cases lead them to view the disposition as illegitimate or
86

See e.g. Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the
Judicial Function. 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1325 (2008).
87
There is a deep and rich literature on this point. For a sampling, see Lawrence
B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 277–81 (2004); Christopher
J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 413 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978).
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unsatisfactory.88 Legitimacy effects for non-parties are also possible.
Some non-parties are affected by the resolution of an appeal because it
clarifies or discusses a relevant particular area of the law. The ability
of interested non-parties to anticipate the effect of a particular
resolution will decrease if the precedential value of a quorum or
irregular panel decision differs from that of a full panel decision. On
that basis, interested non-parties may also prefer a full-panel decision.
Finally, even non-parties without such an interest may be sensitive to
the overall perceived fairness of the system at some level, and may
react negatively to the issuance of decisions by quorum on that basis.
In short, the presence of a regular third judge contributes to the
appearance of justice, and maintaining that appearance may have
significant value even if the judge makes no substantive contribution
to the opinion.89

88

This is essentially the argument raised by the petitioner in Nguyen, 539 U.S.
at 73. Of course, Nguyen might reflect an opportunistic sense of legitimacy. But in
other contexts, the influence of legitimacy considerations on procedural
requirements of uniformity across cases seems clearer. For example, the Second
Circuit’s policy favoring oral argument in merits cases may reflect a judgment that
parties will view a decision reached after oral argument as more legitimate. See
Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, 2007
B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 73 n. 65.
89
Admittedly, the claims related to legitimacy effects, while consistent with the
standard accounts of decisional legitimacy, are largely at the level of conjecture. But
some of these effects may be measurable. For example, there may be evidence that
parties do not consider quorum decisions as equally legitimate as full panel
decisions. Unsatisfied parties have the option to file a motion for panel rehearing or
for rehearing en banc, and parties whose appeals are decided by quorum might be
expected to exercise this option at a higher rate. In terms of non-party effects, a
finding that quorum decisions are cited with less frequency than full-panel decisions
may indicate that other actors in the judicial system view quorums as less legitimate.
This latter finding would also be consistent with another explanation: that
quorum decisions are less likely to involve important or unsettled areas of the law.
But that explanation is undercut by the existence of numerous examples of unsettled
issues being addressed by a quorum. See, e.g., Benzmann, supra note 1; Burt v.
Gates, 502 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding that federal funding to Yale
Law School can be withheld if military recruiters are barred from campus); ITC Ltd.
v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the “famous
marks” doctrine has not been incorporated by Congress into federal trademarks law,
and certifying to the New York Court of Appeals the related question of whether the
“famous marks” doctrine applies to state common law claims of unfair competition).
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Countervailing Considerations

Even if decisions by irregular panels produce modifications in
decisional dynamics, and even if those modifications are undesirable,
they may nevertheless be warranted under certain conditions.
Suboptimal decision-making may be necessary if a decision by a
regular panel is impossible. A full panel of three authorized judges
may not be available in some cases, and a decision by two judges or
by two judges plus an unauthorized third may be the only option for
getting an appeal heard and decided. Arguments rooted in necessity
are common in the context of quorum decisions, and they played a role
in the initial inclusion of a quorum provision for the federal appellate
courts. But necessity is no longer a convincing explanation for
permitting decisions by quorum or by illegitimate panels because the
pool of authorized judges is large enough that genuine unavailability
should never occur. Instead, justifications for decisions by irregular
panels must now be rooted in efficiency, expediency, or futility. The
first two such justifications have limited but legitimate appeal; the
third is facially appealing but ultimately unconvincing.
1.

Institutional Paralysis and Necessity

Quorum provisions ensure that an institution can function even
when the full membership is not present, and in part for that reason
they are a standard feature of legislatures, committees, and corporate
boards.90 This core function of quorums stems from the reality that,
even in the absence of strategic behavior by institutional members,91
90

Necessity arguments have not been raised to justify the inclusion of an
illegitimate panel member, and there is no unique argument to explain why the
inclusion of illegitimate panel members would be necessary. Instead, the argument
would be similar to the necessity argument for quorums: improper judges should be
included because proper judges are not available. For clarity, the discussion here
will be confined to the quorum context.
91
Admittedly, this is not a particularly realistic assumption; in truth,
institutional members will often make themselves unavailable for strategic reasons,
particularly when a supermajority quorum line allows for a minority to paralyze the
institution by refusing to attend. The two-thirds quorum line in Texas has generated
two infamous examples of this type of strategic behavior. John Bryan Williams,
How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum
Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1036
(2006). The framers were well aware of this possibility when debating the quorum
provision that eventually became Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution. Id. at
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full attendance is often difficult or impossible to achieve. As a result, a
requirement of full attendance before the institution can function
would potentially lead to institutional paralysis.92 The prospect of
institutional paralysis is raised when fixed membership is combined
with barriers to substituting for absent members.93 Consider the
Supreme Court, with its fixed membership of nine. If one of those
members resigns or dies, there is a process for replacement, but it is
one not known for its ease or speed.94 In the absence of a quorum
provision, then, a Supreme Court in this situation would be
temporarily paralyzed until the replacement is confirmed. If instead
one of the Court’s members were subject to recusal in a particular
case, replacement would be impossible as the Court is now

1042-44. But the prospect of strategic behavior primarily affects the discussion
about where to place the quorum line rather than about whether to have a line at all.
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 407 (“[M]aximizing attendance is an implausible aim; some absences are
strategic, but some are justified.”) The likelihood of these justified absences
(stemming in large part from geography and the difficulty of travel), and not just the
desire to guard against strategic behavior, motivated the framers to allow the
legislative bodies to act by quorum. Williams, supra at 1038-39.
92
Of course, the need to allow the institution to operate at all must be balanced
against the need to ensure that the institution, when it operates, does so in an
acceptable manner. Because of this concern, a quorum requirement is often
described as setting the level at which the group is “sufficiently represented at a
meeting that its members present can speak for its entire membership.” Mason’s
Manual of Legislative Procedure § 49 (rev. ed. 2000). Serious debates have been
waged over time related to the question of where this level should be set. Perhaps
most notably, the Constitution – after significant debate – sets a bare majority as the
quorum line for both the House of Representatives and the Senate. See Art. I, Section
5; Williams, supra note 91, at 1037-51 (describing the framers’ debate concerning
the quorum line). More recently, economists and political scientists have attempted
to describe empirically where a quorum line should be drawn to ensure close
correlation between the decisions of the quorum and the decisions of the full
membership. See, e.g., Dan S. Felsenthal, 36 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 57 (1991).
93
The jury is an interesting example of a body characterized by fixed
membership but relatively easy substitution. Particularly in the criminal context,
where constitutional requirements dictate that quorum decision-making is not
permitted, we have developed the mechanism of alternate jurors to avoid the
possibility of institutional paralysis. That is, a jury is typically empaneled with 12
members and some number of alternates who are authorized to step in and
participate in the decision process if a regular member becomes unavailable.
94
See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 393 (2002).
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structured.95 In the absence of a quorum provision (or a provision that
would relax the fixed membership of the Court and permit substitution
in instances of recusal),96 this situation would leave the Court
permanently paralyzed, at least as to deciding that case.97
Given the prospect of institutional paralysis, it makes sense as
a matter of institutional design to include a quorum provision for the
Supreme Court, and Congress has always done so. Congress has the
power to dictate the size and composition of the Supreme Court, and
from the very first Judiciary Act of 1789, its exercises of that power
have included provisions to allow the Court to hear cases and issue
decisions with less than the full number of authorized justices.98 As
95

See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 686 (2005); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 608-09
(1947) (“[U]nder existing law, there is no procedure for replacing a disqualified
justice of the Supreme Court even when his non-participation deprives the litigants
of the statutory quorum necessary for decision.”); Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus,
Deciding Whether to Decide, 48 Fed. Law. 45, 46 (Feb. 2001).
96
For a discussion of possible approaches for dealing with the lack of a quorum
in the Supreme Court, see Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress's
Past Power and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 678 (2006); Caprice Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Recusal and
the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004).
97
The Supreme Court has two options when a quorum does not exist. For cases
on direct appeal from a district court, the Chief Justice has the authority to send the
case to the governing circuit court. For other cases, the Court can defer a decision
until the next term, but only if a majority of the qualified justices are of the opinion
that a quorum would be available to decide it upon deferral. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109;
Bassett, supra note 95, at 684.
98
The Judiciary Act of 1789 states that “the Supreme Court of the United States
shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a
quorum.” Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1 Stat. 73. The current statute
governing size and composition provides that the Supreme Court “shall consist of a
Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall
constitute a quorum.” 28 U.S.C. § 1.
The introduction of a quorum provision does not remove the possibility of
institutional paralysis, but it makes that possibility far more remote. For the
Supreme Court to be institutionally paralyzed, four or more of its members must be
unavailable at once. This is a situation that arises only in very rare circumstances.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589,
647 (1987) (“Seldom are at least two-thirds of the Justice not available to decide a
case before them.”). What’s more, the Court has embraced the “rule of necessity,”
which spares itself from potential paralysis in some circumstances where a quorum
would otherwise be unavailable. In its classic form, the rule of necessity is invoked
when all of the Justices are subject to disqualification and “litigants would be denied
their right to a forum,” United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980), but some
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with legislative bodies and corporate boards, the inclusion of a quorum
mechanism in the context of the Supreme Court is motivated by a
desire to leave the Court in a position to fulfill its functions in those
cases where full participation is not possible.99
Similar motivations played a part in the initial inclusion of a
quorum provision for the federal courts of appeal. The formation of
those courts in 1891 was not accompanied by the introduction of the
now-familiar panel system.100 Instead, the circuit courts were to
consist of only two circuit judges, plus the chief justice or the
associate justice of the Supreme Court assigned to each circuit.101 In
the event that a Supreme Court justice failed to take his rightful seat
on the circuit court,102 the district judges within the circuit were made
competent to round out the membership of the court.103 Thus, the
decision to allow district judges to sit on the circuit court was
motivated by a desire to ensure “that the bench will always be well
filled.”104 But empowering district judges to hear appeals was not
individual justices have used similar logic to justify a decision not to recuse on the
grounds that recusal deprives the Court “of the participation of one of its nine
Members” and also increases the likelihood that the Court will be unable to resolve
the case due to a tie, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000)
(mem.) (Rehnquist, C.J.). On this latter point, see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124
S. Ct. 1391, 1394 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.); Bassett, supra note 95, at 682-85
(criticizing the application of “rule of necessity” logic to justify individual recusal
decisions).
99
As with quorums in other contexts, the desire to avoid the strategic creation of
institutional paralysis almost certainly plays a role as well. But at least in the modern
court, this fear may be unfounded. For reasons owing primarily to behavioral norms
rather than to a fixed procedure, there are no analogues of willful absences such as
those discussed supra note 98 by justices of the Court.
100
See 28 U.S.C. § 46 for current panel requirements.
101
Section 2 of the Evarts Act provided that each circuit court of appeals “shall
consist of three judges, of whom two shall constitute a quorum.” Evarts Act, § 2.
102
This was an event that occurred regularly. Almost from the moment the Act
was passed, most Supreme Court justices ceased the long-standing (and long
disdained) practice of riding circuit. See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The
Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1828
(2003).
103
The Evarts Act makes clear that the district judges were to be designated to
the circuit courts only “[i]n case the full court at any time shall not be made up by
the attendance of the Chief-Justice or an associate justice of the Supreme Court and
circuit judges.” Evarts Act, § 3.
104
21 Cong. Rec. 10223 (remarks of Sen. Evarts). In previous efforts to create
intermediate courts of appeals, provisions that allowed district judges to sit were
considered but rejected. The concerns underlying the rejection seem to have been
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enough. A provision precluding circuit judges and district judges from
hearing cases on appeal with which they were involved at the trial
level, together with the acknowledged likelihood that Supreme Court
justices would not regularly attend, raised the very real possibility that
a full court of three judges would not be found to hear a given appeal.
An option to proceed by quorum was therefore viewed as necessary to
ensure that the court could function in every circumstance.105
That option is no longer necessary. The substitution barriers
that support quorum provisions in legislatures, corporate boards, and
even the Supreme Court are not now present in the context of the
federal appellate courts. The structure and composition of the federal
appellate courts has changed significantly since 1891, and the
concerns that motivated the initial inclusions of a quorum provision
are no longer relevant. While the number of judges who hear any
given appeal remains three, the pool of judges available to form that
number has increased dramatically.106 Most important to this change
is the general growth in the total number of appellate judges
authorized by Congress. Even the smallest circuit – the First – now
two-fold. First, there was a desire, based on a mix of fears related to incompetence
and ideology, to exclude district judges from performing appellate work. See, e.g.,
amendment of Sen. Jones, 13 Cong. Rec. 3698 (“I do not think that it is wise to
invest the district judges with the high appellate power proposed by the bill, because
I think it is nothing but human nature for such judges after they once taste the
exercise of higher authority to be, I will not say absolutely inefficient, but not as
capable or as well inclined to perform their other functions as they would be outside
of it.”). Second, there was a resistance to the possibility of revolving composition in
the appellate courts. See, e.g., Sen. Davis, 13 Cong. Rec. 3464 (“[I]t is obvious that
the opinions of a section would not command that moral weight and influence which
those of the entire court have heretofore enjoyed and which have secured for it the
merited confidence of the people.”); Sen. Jones, 13 Cong. Rec. 3698 (“If we are
going to have a court that will give confidence to the people and to the profession, I
would . . . have a permanent tribunal and not a shifting one made up of one set of
perambulating judges today and another set to-morrow.”).
105
In response to questions raised by Senator Gray about the ability to designate
district judges to perform appellate work, Senator Evarts was careful to note that
although designation was possible, he did not “wish to disturb the competency of the
quorum of two to discharge cases if they should undertake it. . . . There may be
instances in which although three judges were in attendance, yet one of the circuit
judges might be unable to sit in a particular case.” 21 Cong. Rec. 10223.
106
The availability of a large pool of judges from which to compose a decisionmaking panel distinguishes the current federal appellate structure not only from the
structure originally created by the Evarts Act, but also from the Supreme Court. See
Bassett, supra note 95, at 686 (noting the potential for substitution in the courts of
appeals, as well as the inability to substitute in the Supreme Court).
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has six authorized judges, and the mean number of judge per circuit is
roughly 14.107 The ongoing participation by senior circuit judges adds
further to the number of judges available to hear appeals,108 as does
the contribution of district court judges sitting by designation.109
Developments in travel and technology also play a role. Substitution
is now more practical because judges can travel to the location of the
oral argument with greater speed and less expense, and because they
can more easily participate in the decision-making process without
traveling through mechanisms like electronic transmission of
documents and audio review of oral arguments. The combined result
of this proliferation is that a circumstance where three judges could
not be found to decide an appeal is almost inconceivable.110
In the absence of substitution barriers, a necessity argument for
a quorum provision is much harder to sustain. If easy substitution is
possible, then a “full membership” requirement is realistic in every
case. Although we still might adopt a policy permitting quorum
decision-making in this situation, the core reason for doing so would
be a matter of institutional preference rather than necessity. And the
question of whether that policy would be institutionally preferable
107

There are a total of 179 authorized judgeships spread out over the 13 federal
circuits. Of course, the actual number of active appellate judges regularly differs
from the authorized number due to unfilled vacancies. But the prospect of vacancies
is not enough to overcome the substantial increase in authorized positions, so the
number of judges sitting in each circuit is now much higher than it was over a
century ago. Moreover, the factors described in the remainder of the paragraph
further support the proposition that the set of cases for which three judges may not
be found is null.
108
28 U.S.C. § 371(b) provides statutory authority for senior circuit judges to
participate in appeals. For a discussion of this practice, see David R. Stras & Ryan
W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007).
109
28 U.S.C. § 292 provides the statutory authority for district judges and senior
district judges to participate in the resolution of federal appeals. For a discussion of
the practice of judges sitting by designation in the federal courts of appeals, see
Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An
Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 351 (1995).
110
Indeed, even in situations where every judge in a circuit has been recused, an
appeal may still be heard under the current framework. See, e.g., In re Nettles, 394
F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005) (recusing all Seventh Circuit judges from hearing further
appeals in case involving criminal defendant charged with plotting to bomb
Chicago’s federal courthouse); United States v. Nettles, 476 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2007)
(composing a panel of three Sixth Circuit judges to hear the appeal). This outcome
makes clear that the “rule of necessity,” see discussion supra note 98, need not be
invoked at the federal appellate level because of the potential for substitution.
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would turn on an assessment of whether quorums improve decisional
efficiency while still producing results that are acceptable. In short,
traditional concerns sounding in necessity and institutional paralysis
have no voice in the current appellate context and do not form an
independent basis for maintaining the prevailing quorum practice.
2.

Futility

Beyond necessity, perhaps the most obvious and facially
compelling argument against adding a replacement judge when the
remaining two judges agree is that the addition would be futile. The
futility argument derives from the decision rule that applies in the
federal appellate context: Given a regime of three-judge panels and
majority voting, agreement by any two judges is all that is required to
determine the outcome of an appeal. If two judges agree, then the
decision rule is satisfied and the addition of a third judge appears to be
merely a matter of form. It might affect the result in a technical sense,
by changing the vote from 2-0 to 3-0 or 2-1, but it would have no
practical impact.
The futility argument is especially powerful because it
eliminates any need to worry about competing interests. If there is no
practical benefit to be achieved, why incur any costs? This logic is
powerful, but it operates largely beneath the surface. Even when they
explain themselves, two-judge panels do not tend to rely on futility.
Such notions appear in none of the cases discussed in Part I.B. But the
argument almost certainly informs the attitudes of courts toward
quorum decision-making, and a hint of it often lurks even in the very
invocation of the quorum statute itself. As discussed shortly, many
circuits have structured their local procedures to give a putative
quorum discretion to decide when they agree. By choosing to exercise
this discretion, the judges convey two messages: that they agree and
that they do not consider it necessary to add a third judge. Those two
messages are almost certainly connected – the addition of a third judge
is not necessary precisely because the two judges agree, rendering any
addition futile.
Its intuitive appeal notwithstanding, futility does not easily
justify a policy of permitting quorum decisions. The pure futility
argument is rooted in an assertion that the addition of a third judge
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simply makes no difference.111 The voting rule applicable in the
appellate context surely creates some pull in that direction, but in the
end the argument is convincing only under a static model of appellate
decision-making that views the final vote in a case as the aggregation
of the fixed and independent vote of each judge on the panel. This
view reflects the longstanding approach toward the study of judicial
voting in multi-judge panels, which has focused on the individual
views of each judge and has generally ignored the interaction between
those views.112 But as discussed at length in the previous section, this
view is ultimately deficient because it fails to capture the various ways
in which the final decision reached by three judges will vary in terms
of direction, content, and reception from the one reached by a quorum
of two. Once the dynamic nature of the appellate process is
recognized, the pure futility argument becomes untenable. The
addition of a third judge still may be undesirable, but it should not be
described as futile.113

111

An argument that it is futile to add a third judge because any positive
contribution they might make will be outweighed by some competing negative cost –
delay, judicial resources, etc. – is not really a futility argument. Instead, it is an
argument rooted in the assertion of cost.
112
See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 58, at 148 (“In the conventional ideological
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, judges are not amenable to persuasion.
The judges of this model know their own preferences and can be straightforward in
voting to implement those preferences.”).
113
A final point: futility proves too much. If it really were futile to add a third
judge to a group of two judges who agree, then it would make sense to consider
seriously the prospect of appointing only two judges to appellate panels as a matter
of course. Since most appellate opinions are unanimous, the expected outcome of
this approach would be to produce quorums that could decide the appeal in most
cases. Only when the two judges failed to agree would a third judge need to be
involved as a tiebreaker. Indeed, a similar system was used for some time to decide
motions in the D.C. Circuit. But the system is problematic, and not just because it
runs afoul of the statutory formation requirements of § 46. More fundamentally, it is
inconsistent with the congressional desire that the outcome of appeals be the product
of three minds. See discussion accompanying notes 14-16. This desire, rooted in the
recognition of functional benefits that flow from the involvement of three judges,
reflects a judgment that a third judge is not futile over the run of cases. See Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982; United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 51 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (“The touchstone for this pluralism [in the
appellate process] is a belief that the more minds considering a matter, the better the
ultimate resolution of the case is likely to be.”).
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Efficiency and the Conservation of Judicial Resources

At this point, what remain to support the use of quorums are
arguments about relative costs and benefits. Even if decisions by
irregular panels are not strictly necessary, and even if they are
functionally inferior in some way, they may nevertheless be desirable
if they serve some competing goal. One possibility along these lines is
that decisions by irregular panels conserve judicial resources. For
years, judges and academic commentators have noted with alarm the
increasing strain on judicial resources in the federal system.114 The
federal appellate caseload has increased dramatically in the last 50
years, and the increase in the number of judges authorized to decide
those cases has not come close to keeping pace.115 As a result, the
number of dispositions per judge has increased steadily over time,
giving rise to concerns about the effect of judicial strain on the quality
of justice delivered by the federal appellate system.116 These concerns
114

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
59–93 (1985); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul
of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25–26 (1996) (discussing federal
caseload crisis); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts:
Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1485, 1487–91 (1995) (same); Sarang V. Damle, Specialize the Judge Not the
Court: A Lesson From the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267,
1275-76 (2005) (same); Tracey E. George; Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The
Limits of Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (discussing federal caseload crisis); Dione C. Greene, The
Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished Decisions, and the “No-Citation Rule,” 81
IND. L.J. 1503, 1505-07 (2006) (same).
115
In just the thirteen years between 1992 and 2005, appellate case filings
increased over 40% (from 47,000 to almost 68,5000), while the number of
authorized judgeships remained unchanged. Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile
Report (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl (click on the
“Generate” button); Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile Report (1997),
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa.pl (click on the “Generate” button).
116
See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 114, at 8-9; Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of Decision-Making
Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 661 (2007)
(“These caseload burdens have caused judges to implement reforms that deviate
from the traditional or classic model of appellate adjudication… As a consequence,
only a small portion of cases appealed to the circuits receive the form of traditional
appellate justice that conforms to the classic model. This development is seen as
undermining the quality of the work produced by the circuits and as affecting the
degree to which all litigants are treated equally.”); Christopher F. Carlton, The
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have motivated many actions by courts117 and even more proposals by
commentators118 designed to conserve judicial resources by improving
the efficiency of the decision-making process.
In terms of judicial resources and efficiency, deciding cases
with two Article III judges rather than three is attractive. Thus, both
quorum decisions and decisions involving illegitimate panel members
may be viewed as providing a mechanism to reduce judicial strain.119

Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing the Federal Courts of the
Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (1997).
117
Every circuit has instituted alternative dispute resolution programs pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION &
CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1997). Appellate
courts have also promoted arbitration as an alternative to litigation, and have
reviewed arbitration awards narrowly to ensure that that alternative does not become
just another layer in the litigation process. See, e.g., Cyctyc Corp. v. DEKA Prods.
Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). Most dramatically, courts have decided
cases with less effort through unpublished opinions, which have increased from
11.25% of total opinions in 1981 to 81.6% in 2005. See Michael Hannon, A Closer
Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 203 (2001); U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. S-3
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s3.pdf; see also
POSNER, supra note 114, at 162–71.
118
See, e.g., Dione C. Greene, The Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished
Decisions, and the “No-Citation Rule,” 81 IND. L.J. 1503, (2006) (discussing
responses to the caseload crisis); Lindquist, supra note 116, at 661; Carlton, supra
note 116, at 3-10 (suggesting increased use of technology, specialized subject matter
appellate courts, discretionary appellate review, more circuit judgeships, greater
application of alternative dispute resolution, jumbo and/or unitary courts of appeals,
and altered opinion-writing as possible solutions to the caseload crisis).
119
If the effort required to decide an appeal were fixed and simply divided
among the judges – however many – charged with reaching that decision, then
deciding by quorum would not provide an efficiency benefit relative to a three-judge
decision. But appellate decision-making does not fit that description; instead, there
is an intentional redundancy involved, so that the amount of effort required increases
as does the number of judges. The primary source of this redundancy is independent
preparation – each judge is expected to read the briefs and cases necessary to
participate meaningfully in the decisional process. See, e.g., United States v. Glover,
731 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (describing the appellate
process as “three judges separately considering the matter and a separate
‘contemplative process’ for the matter”); Robert Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional
Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722, 723-24 (1983). In this context, the addition of a third
judge to an existing quorum of two entails an increase in the resources that must be
allocated to reach a decision. Put conversely, deciding a case with only two judges
enhances efficiency.
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In that light, it is unsurprising that efficiency concerns figure
prominently in the sole departure from simple assertions of statutory
authority as a justification for decision by judicial quorum.120 In
Murray, the Second Circuit was forced to go beyond statutory
authority because the appellant also raised a facially convincing
argument based on the court’s local rule.121 To defeat that argument,
Judge Newman concluded that an unnatural reading of the rule was
warranted – and that conclusion was based explicitly on considerations
of efficiency: “When a judge becomes aware of a ground of
disqualification just prior to oral argument, replacement of the recused
judge would impair the court’s efficiency and burden the parties with a
return visit to the court.”122 Although this represents one of the very
few explicit acknowledgments of efficiency as a motivating
consideration behind quorum decision-making, it should not be
viewed as an outlier. To the contrary, the desire to conserve judicial
resources is almost certainly behind a great deal of the instances of
quorum decision-making that are issued without justification.

As for the inclusion of improper judges, the efficiency gain derives from the
fact that some of the independent preparation is performed by a judge outside of the
Article III pool. Of course, if the improper judge comes from a pool that is itself
affected by resource strain, then the net result may simply be to transfer strain from
the Article III pool to some different pool. Even in this situation, Article III judges
may still be expected to choose this option because they will not internalize the
strain imposed elsewhere. In any event, the effect for Article III judges is to reduce
the amount of work that must be performed.
120
In a sense, the military cases discussed supra note 47, also involved the
absence of statutory authority because no specific statute authorized quorum
decisions. But the resolution of those cases are in fact based on a finding of
statutory authority: the court concludes that the Advocates general possessed proper
authority to promulgate rules (including quorum rules) in the absence of a command
to the contrary. See, e.g., Petroff-Tachomakoff, 5 USCMA at 829.
121
The argument based on federal statute was quickly and predictably
dispatched by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). Murray, 35 F.3d at 47.
122
Id. at 48. Judge Newman also makes a passing attempt at a statutory
justification for his broad reading by suggesting that “a rigid application of the local
rule would arguably place it in tension with the statutory authority of two judges to
constitute a quorum.” Murray, 35 F.3d at 48 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)). But that
attempt is unconvincing. As Judge Newman acknowledges, the statute in question
merely provides authority for a judicial quorum; it constitutes no mandate. For
further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 165-170.
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Expediency and the Interests of Litigants

In addition to being more efficient, decisions by irregular
panels may also be more expedient.123 The concern for expediency is
reflected in current procedural rules, and often underlies proposals for
procedural reform. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1
states that the rules are to “construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”124 The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, one of the most significant recent
procedural reforms, was explicitly directed at improving expediency in
the district courts. The Senate Report accompanying the bill lamented
that “high costs, long delays and insufficient judicial resources all too
often leave [the] time-honored promise [of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1]
unfulfilled.”125 More recently, academic commentators and appellate
courts have expressed concerns about the lack of expediency in the
immigration system.126 Finally, and most notably for present
123

Expediency and efficiency are related but not identical concepts. The
efficiency concerns just discussed center around the desire to conserve judicial
resources, in order to minimize the strain on the judges who must decide the
voluminous cases before them. Expediency is instead directed at rendering a
decision quickly to vindicate the litigants’ interest in having their dispute resolved in
a timely manner. Put differently, efficiency is judge-focused while expediency is
litigant-focused. In many circumstances, the two interests may be aligned. For
example, introducing a mechanism to decide cases without a full opinion will both
reduce strain on judges (thereby serving efficiency) and permit decisions to be
reached faster (thereby serving expediency). But the alignment is not complete. The
class action device represents an example of divergence; consolidation of claims into
a class action is justified in part based on efficiency across cases, but that often
comes at a cost in expediency terms for individual claimants. Other procedural
mechanisms affect one interest without affecting the other in either direction. For
example, the Ninth Circuit practice of assigning bench memos to one judge on a
panel is motivated by a desire to increase efficiency of case preparation, but the
practice has no effect on the speed at which cases are ultimately decided.
124
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
125
S. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., 1 (1990), reprinted at 1990
U.S.S.C.A.N. 6802. For excellent political accounts of the CJRA and its passage,
see Linda Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375 (1992); Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994).
126
See, e.g., Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 2006); RamirezAlejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2003). Immigration appeals for longtime residents or asylum seekers can last over a year or more. Barbara Hines, An
Overview of U.S. Immigration Law And Policy Since 9/11, 12 TEX. HISP. J. L. &
POL'Y 9 (2006). Efforts to improve expediency have created other problems like
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purposes, the appellate courts themselves have not escaped complaints
about insufficient expediency in deciding appeals.127
Decisions by quorum will produce expediency gains in many
cases. To participate meaningfully, a third judge will need time to get
up to speed on the case and its issues, which will lengthen the time
necessary to reach a decision. The later in the process the judge is
added, the greater the delay the addition should cause. Deciding with
only two judges, by contrast, should enhance expediency, not only
because the delay just mentioned is avoided, but also because two
judges rather than three are involved in the process. In many
circumstances, reducing the manpower allocated to a task will
lengthen the time necessary for its completion, but the opposite is
likely true for appellate decision-making. The typical post-argument
sequence for an appellate decision is an initial conference, followed by
assignment of the opinion writing task to one judge, followed by a
period of modification based on feedback from the remaining
judges.128 When two judges are involved rather than three, the
modification period should be shortened because the number of judges
whose feedback must be incorporated and accommodated is smaller.

inadequate attention to individual cases. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828,
828-29 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “the adjudication of [immigration] cases at
the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice”);
see also Won Kidane, Revisiting The Rules Of Procedure And Evidence Applicable
In Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lessons From The
Department Of Labor Rules Of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 97 (2007)
(“Courts of appeals have repeatedly complained about inconsistent, incoherent, and
even outright erroneous decisions.”).
127
See MARTIN & PRESCOTT, APPELLATE COURT DELAY: STRUCTURAL
RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF VOLUME AND DELAY (1981); Benjamin R.
Civiletti, Zeroing In On The Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless
Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 44-45 (1986) (“No rational person can
justify the incredible delays seen in this country's courts.”); Irving R. Kaufman,
Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1991) (“Faced with ever-burgeoning caseloads and
essentially static resources, the nation's courts fall further and further behind the
promise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing
Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225 (1997).
128
See Robert Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722,
725-28 (1983).
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Expediency has not been specifically invoked to support
quorum decision-making,129 but that is no reason to conclude that
judges are unmoved by it. To the contrary, judges frequently invoke
expediency as a justification for judicial procedures, even when those
procedures arguably exact a cost in terms of decisional accuracy. For
example, Judge Boudin has criticized the federal practice of certifying
state law questions on expediency grounds. While conceding that the
practice may enhance accuracy,130 Judge Boudin nevertheless
expressed concern that certification unduly lengthens the time required
to get cases decided.131 It is easy to imagine similar logic being
brought to bear in the context of irregular panels.
129

Murray, for example, is justified almost exclusively on the grounds of
efficiency; expediency is largely ignored, even when it would be natural to
acknowledge it. For example, although the opinion notes that adding a third judge
might require the oral argument to be postponed, the purpose in doing so is not to
lament the costs of the delay to the parties (except insofar as it would “burden [them]
with a return visit to the court”), but instead to emphasize that the time and effort of
the judges would be wasted, thus “impair[ing] the court’s efficiency.” Murray, 35
F.3d at 48. The closest Murray comes to expediency is a passing remark that “the
[local] rule is obviously intended to permit the Court to conduct its business
expeditiously despite the unanticipated unavailability of one member of a threejudge panel.” Id. at 47. Even here, though, it is not clear that the interest of parties
plays anything but a minor and supporting role relative to the interest in the court
itself to function efficiently for its own sake.
130
This point was made emphatically by Judge Calabresi, who defended his efforts
to expand the certification practice in large part based on accuracy: “[I]n somewhere
between a third and half of the cases, the way our panel would have decided it turned
out not to be the way New York and Connecticut [decided it]… [T]he fact is that at
least in our circuit, the difference between what we would have said that law was and
what they say is significant.” Available at http://www.bu.edu/law/events/audiovideo/playback.html?instance=role&stream= role1-9.
131
“[T]he work of judges is a tension between getting decisions right, in some
hypothetical and probably not very realistic sense of right, and getting the world’s
work done. And the cost and delay of getting a slightly different decision in a
particular unique case has seemed to us increasingly to completely outweigh the
advantages of getting the [state court] to tell us what the rule is. . . . [M]y view is you
get the case decided the best you can, and what most lawyers and most clients want
is an answer. . . .” http://www.bu.edu/law/events/audio-video/playback.html?
instance=role&stream=role1-9. Judge Boudin is not the only First Circuit judge who
has demonstrated skepticism of this sort. See Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness:
Ask a Silly Question…, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677 (1995) (arguing against
certification in part because “litigants do not have an entitlement to something
identifiable in the abstract as a ‘right’ answer”).
Not all judges agree, of course. Judge Calabresi, for example, does not accept
that parties are uninterested in accuracy: “[M]ost of these are cases which have been

Irregular Panels

III.

42

TOWARD A UNIFIED TREATMENT OF IRREGULAR PANELS

The standard requirement that an appeal be decided by three
judges has a functional dimension, and should not be relaxed lightly.
Instead, departures from the standard requirement should be permitted
only when the legitimate costs of adherence to the requirement
outweigh the expected functional benefit. If judges could accurately
identify and assess costs and benefits, some cases involving irregular
panels should lead to substitution, and others should not. But judges
rarely consider these costs and benefits explicitly, and they would not
do a very good job of assessing them even if they did. In particular,
the mechanism of self-assessment will lead judges to value illegitimate
costs, to overvalue legitimate costs, and to undervalue functional
benefits.
This Part begins by describing local rules and procedures that
courts have introduced to address decisions by irregular panels. On
the whole, these rules restrict self-assessment in some cases, but leave
the treatment of many others in the hands of the judges who make up
the irregular panel. This Part then proposes various ways that the
approach to irregular panels might be improved. The weighing of
costs and benefits might be improved, either by focusing the decision
and requiring explicit consideration of process values or by shifting
the decision to judges who are not themselves members of the
irregular panel. Instead, the suggested solution is to replace selfassessment with a firm policy of replacement in all instances of
judicial unavailability. Thus, a common rule ties together the
treatment of irregular panels: resolution of an appeal should reflect
the participation of three authorized judges.

appealed all the way up to us, the people have spent a huge amount of money, have
taken a very large amount of time, to get to us. . . . Do you really think that the
parties would rather just get it done quickly and then find out six months later or a
year later that New York doesn’t really like it?” Id. For more on the (un)willingness
of parties to trade process for efficiency, see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections
on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1, 10 (1983) (describing a local rule that promised an expedited decision in
exchange for a disposition without opinion, and remarking that “I know of no case in
which litigants have invoked the rule”); David P. Currie, Federal Courts and the
ALI, Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (describing the certification process
as a tradeoff between costs and delays and the avoidance of error).
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Local Rules as Constraints

As described in Part I, the relevant statutory framework
permits decision by quorum whenever a member of a properly
constituted panel becomes unavailable, and no additional constraints
have been imposed through court opinions. But there is another
relevant source of authority that acts as a constraint in certain cases:
most federal circuits have local rules or internal operating procedures
that govern the unavailability of an assigned panel member. Although
there is a predictable degree of similarity in these rules owing to their
shared statutory foundation, there are also significant variations,
ranging from the general approach in cases of unavailability to the
very specific procedures that are followed when those instances
arise.132
The most common limitation on quorum decisions is based on
the timing of the unavailability. Among circuits that make such a
distinction, the usual presumption is in favor of replacement in cases
where the unavailability arises before oral argument or submission,
and against replacement where it arises thereafter. For example, the
Third Circuit has a formal procedure that governs situations where a
judge becomes unavailable after the panel is assigned but before the
case is argued and submitted.133 No existing procedure covers
unavailability that develops after the case is argued; instead, the court
clerk notes that “the case law makes it clear that if the two remaining
judges agree they can decide the case.”134 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
has a “back-up judge system” that functions to provide replacements

132

To survey these variations, I sent letters to the court clerks of each of the
thirteen federal circuits, and received responses from 11 circuits that detail not only
the local written procedure (if any) that is followed in each circuit, but also the
informal ways that instances of unavailability are handled. Most circuits have an
operating procedure or a local rule that addresses (at least in basic terms) the
unavailability of a panel member. See Second Circuit Rule §0.14(b); Third Circuit
IOP 11.1.3; Fourth Circuit IOP 36.2; Fifth Circuit Practitioner’s Guide p. 69; Eighth
Circuit Rule 47E; Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2(g); Federal Circuit IOP 5 and
Rule 47.11. But not all do – the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits do not
appear to have any local rules or procedures that address unavailability.
133
Third Circuit IOP 11.1.3.
134
Letter from Third Circuit. The Federal Circuit has a similar structure, but
formal policies exist to address both pre- and post-argument unavailability. See IOP
#5.3 (requiring substitution for pre-argument unavailability and permitting decision
by quorum for post-argument unavailability).
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for judges that become unavailable before argument.135 If the
unavailability arises after the argument, however, the back-up system
is not invoked, and the two judges are instead permitted to decide the
case if in agreement.
Minor variations aside, all circuits but one permit a panel of
two judges to decide the merits of an appeal in certain circumstances.
In the absence of an automatic replacement policy, the question of
replacement is typically left to the remaining two panel judges.136
Generally, a third judge must be assigned to replace an unavailable
judge if the two remaining judges do not agree, and may be assigned if
the two remaining judges agree but decline to exercise their discretion
to decide the case by quorum. It is difficult to know, except
anecdotally, how often these situations arise because the resulting
opinion is typically issued without any notation that a third judge was
appointed to substitute for an unavailable judge. But most circuits
seem to adopt a permissive view toward deciding cases with only two
judges, and third judges are appointed only in extreme circumstances.
Indeed, in the case of the Eighth Circuit, that view was explicitly
recognized by the court clerk, who described the court’s local rule as
“express[ing] the court’s preference that the remaining two judges
should decide the case if a judge on the three-judge panel dies or
becomes disabled after the case is submitted.”137
135

Letter from Sixth Circuit, paragraph 4.
See, e.g., e-mail from Fourth Circuit (“Assuming that the remaining two
panel members are in agreement on the case, whether to decide the case by quorum
is left to the discretion of the remaining panel members.”); Letter from Sixth Circuit
(“The decision about whether or not to go forward as a panel of two is left to the
remaining judges on the panel. If they are in agreement about the result of the case,
they probably would go forward without a replacement judge.”); Letter from D.C.
Circuit (“Ordinarily, if the two remaining judges are in agreement as to the
disposition of the appeal, no third judge will be assigned to the panel. This,
however, as mentioned above is not a rule of the court and is left entirely to the
discretion of the remaining panel members.”).
137
Letter from Eighth Circuit, paragraph 2. The general permissive attitude
toward quorum decisions has even led some courts to ignore limits placed on those
decisions by local rule. Murray is an example: beyond the standard complaint about
quorum decisions, Murray involved an additional challenge based on the court’s
local rule. As a textual matter, the challenge was a powerful one. The version of
Second Circuit Local Rule §0.14(b) then in force authorized a quorum decision only
in cases of unavailability involving a panel “which has heard argument or taken
under submission any appeal.” Second Circuit Local Rule §0.14(b) (1994) (quoted
in Murray, 35 F.3d at 47). Because the third judge recused before the argument was
heard, the local rule did not apply by its terms. Judge Newman conceded “the force
136
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The exception to this general pattern is the Ninth Circuit,
which alone has adopted a strong policy of replacement that extends to
all instances of unavailability. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2(h)
provides that a third judge will be appointed to replace a judge who
becomes unavailable before oral argument, even if the need to replace
would require postponing the argument of the case to the next
calendar. Similarly, General Order 3.2(g) provides that a third judge
will be drawn by lot if a panel member dies, becomes disabled, or
leaves the court after the case has been submitted. The clerk of the
Ninth Circuit described the Court’s policy as “strict in not deciding
cases on the merits with only two judges. We will always draw a third
judge.”138
In sum, all circuits but the Ninth use local rules to impose
limitations on the statutory ability to decide by quorum, particularly
when the unavailability arises relatively early in the decisional
process. At some level, this is an understandable approach that
reflects an attempt to balance competing considerations of accuracy
and efficiency. When a judge becomes unavailable after oral
argument, a preliminary vote has already occurred and there is some
sense of certainty about the outcome. Once those preliminary votes
have occurred, judges’ opinions about the resolution of the case may
become relatively more fixed. In addition, replacement after oral
argument should lead to a greater delay in the ultimate resolution of
the appeal. Thus, the extant local rules may be seen as reflecting a
reasonable preference for quorum decisions in circumstances where
replacement would be particularly futile and inexpedient.
B.

Weaknesses and Improvements

Although the local rules soften the effect of the statutory
regime by favoring replacement in some subset of cases, weaknesses
persist. As described in the previous section, local rules generally
of the argument based on the literal wording of the local rule,” but rejected it even so
based on his conclusion that “‘any sacrifice of literalness for common sense does no
violence’ to the purpose of the rule.” Murray, 35 F.3d at 47 (quoting Textile Mills
Securities Corp. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 334 (1941)).
He might indeed be right that it makes little sense to distinguish based on whether a
third judge sits through the argument or leaves just before. Still, that was the line
clearly drawn by the rule, and the court’s willingness to redraw it demonstrates an
eagerness to authorize quorum decision-making whenever possible.
138
E-mail from Ninth Circuit.
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require replacement in cases of early unavailability, but impose no
restrictions when judicial unavailability occurs after an appeal is
submitted.139 But the interaction of views, which is an essential
component of multi-judge decision-making, often does not begin in
earnest until submission, and the events occurring afterward –
particularly the circulation of opinions and suggested revisions – are
arguably those where the need for multiple opinions is greatest. Given
a proper understanding of the dynamics discussed in Part II,
replacement should produce significant value even when it occurs
relatively late in the game.
In theory, the current approach leaves room for that value to be
recognized. After all, local rules permit putative quorums to decline to
exercise statutory authority and instead request the assignment of a
third judge. Conversely, in cases where the added value would be
minimal and would come at a cost of significant time and resources,
the local rules would permit the quorum to bypass replacement in
favor of a quick decision. But a system based on self-assessment is
likely to do a poor job of accurately distinguishing between these two
categories of cases. For reasons that will be taken up in the next
section, the judges who constitute the quorum are likely to overvalue
expediency and undervalue the prospective contributions of a new
third member. To address that tendency, some modification in the
current approach is desirable.
1.

Enhanced Self-Assessment

The least dramatic route to improving the treatment of
quorums is to bolster the consideration of process values by the judges
who are charged with making the replacement decision. An
improvement along these lines leaves authority to decide between
seeking substitution and proceeding by quorum with the two
remaining judges on a panel, at least in some class of cases.140 At the
same time, it recognizes that the authority to decide should be guided

139

Indeed, some local rules seem to swing toward encouraging non-replacement
in cases of late unavailability. See text accompanying note 137.
140
A choice would still need to be made between whether to leave the two
remaining judges to that choice in all cases, or to require substitution in some class
of cases. It is not necessary to dwell on this choice, however, because I will
ultimately conclude that neither is desirable.
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in an effort to avoid problematic outcomes that result when choice is
unfettered.
Professor Bassett has suggested this type of improvement in
the context of Supreme Court recusal.141 Although she concludes that
the current system – which places decision-making authority in the
hands of each justice – is deficient because justices are likely to make
decisional errors, her proposed solution is relatively modest: to leave
the decision-making authority “where it essentially is now – resting
with the conscience of each individual Justice,”142 but to add new
reporting requirements designed to “focus each Justice’s attention on
matters involving the potential for bias” and to “invigorate public
confidence in the Court” by enhancing decisional transparency.143 A
proposal in this spirit might take various forms when applied to the
quorum context. The two remaining judges might simply be
instructed to consider explicitly such factors as whether the decisional
process might benefit from the contributions of a third judge or
whether the legitimacy of the outcome might be enhanced by the
presence of a third judge, and might be required to write an opinion
explaining the decision in those terms.144 Or a rebuttable presumption
in favor of replacing the missing judge could be added, either

141

See Bassett, supra note 95, at 693-97. Judicial recusal and quorum decisionmaking share some key features. As with judicial quorums, the current recusal
framework asks judges to make decisions based in part on a self-assessment of the
process values implicated by their action, and to do so in a largely unguided and
unchecked manner. Critics have complained that that framework leads courts to
narrow applicable standards “through interpretation to the point where they no
longer serve the intended purpose,” in large part because judges are unable or
unwilling to accurately assess when the standards are met. Amanda Frost, Keeping
Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 531, 551 (2005).
142
Bassett, supra note 95, at 695. As should be plain from the title of her article
and the quoted text, Professor Bassett’s focus is on the Supreme Court rather than on
the federal system as a whole. That distinction is important to her choice of
approach because the inability to substitute at the Supreme Court level argues in
favor of a “less-demanding recusal standard for Supreme Court Justices than for
other federal judges.” Id. at 697. But the distinction is less important here, as her
approach is merely offered as an example of a process-bolstering modification.
143
Id. at 695-96.
144
See Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust 15-16 (August 21,
2007) (discussing a “duty of explanation” as a potential source of error reduction).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008672.
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universally or in certain situations (e.g., where the unavailability
occurs before an initial draft of the opinion has been circulated).145
Although occasional examples of judicial recognition of
decisional dynamics provide some room for optimism,146 there is
145

Some of the existing court procedures effectively include such presumptions.
For example, some circuits require replacement when a judge becomes unavailable
before oral argument is held. See supra Part III.A. Indeed, this approach is more
restrictive than the establishment of a presumption because it removes the discretion
of the two remaining judges altogether. As for the second possibility mentioned in
the text, an effort to make distinctions along those lines would require the court to
engage in a serious and potentially nettlesome consideration of the mechanics of the
decisional process. For an example of such an attempt, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962).
146
In a variety of contexts, appellate courts have occasionally recognized the
dynamic nature of the decision-making process, and have concluded that applicable
decisional rules must be structured in light of that nature.
Jury decision-making. The Fourth Circuit recently rejected a verdict
reached by a jury because a juror had been erroneously removed before the start of
deliberations and absent party stipulation. United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273
(4th Cir. 2003). This conclusion was not constitutional in dimension. Instead, the
majority concluded that the dismissal was inconsistent with the requirements of Fed.
R. Crim. Pro. 23(b), and they emphasized that “[w]e simply cannot know what affect
[sic] a twelfth juror might have had on jury deliberations.” Id. at 281. It is possible
to view the Curbelo conclusion as a Nguyen equivalent: the majority concluded that
an eleven person jury in this situation had no authority to act. But the basis for
concluding that this lack of authority amounted to structural error seems to be that
the jury decision-making process is such that it is impossible to extrapolate from a
decision of eleven jurors what a jury of twelve might decide. Harmless error review
is therefore impossible because the twelfth juror “might, during the course of jury
deliberations, have been able to raise persuasive points in Curbelo’s defense; the
juror may even have held out for acquittal on all counts.” Id. at 288. Perhaps this
result is explained by the unanimous voting rule that applies to jury decisions. Yet
there is more than a hint here that the extra juror is important not only because of the
vote that she will cast, but also because of the influence she may have on the votes
cast by others.
En banc voting. In 1978, the Fourth Circuit cast an initial conference vote
of 4-3 after hearing an en banc oral argument. One of the judges in the majority then
died, but the opinion issued with the original voting preserved. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Mathews, 562 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1978). On a motion for
rehearing, the court later concluded that the vote of the deceased judge could not be
counted; the vote then became 3-3 and the opinion of the lower court was affirmed
rather than reversed. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mathews, 571 F.2d
1273 (4th Cir. 1978). Although the deceased judge had tentatively voted at
conference and had even approved the language of some of the proposed majority
opinion, his vote was not legitimate because “[h]is death occurred . . . before the
dissenting and concurring opinions were written and before the court’s decision was
announced.” Id. at 1276. This outcome might be explained in terms of statutory
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reason to doubt the overall effectiveness of this sort of approach. The
primary cause for doubt is that the responsibility for assessing process
values remains with those who are engaged in the decision. The
problems associated with this arrangement are two-fold: selfassessment may be subject to bias that contributes to results that are
actually unfair,147 and may be perceived as unfair or illegitimate even
in the absence of bias.148 Relative to the recusal context, where selfassessment has been roundly criticized on these grounds,149 the
perceived unfairness concern is perhaps diminished in the quorum
context because the connection between unfairness and the failure to
add a third judge is somewhat weaker.150 But the potential for
power and nothing more. Id. (citing United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp.,
363 U.S 690 (1960), for the proposition that judges who are not active when a case is
decided lack the statutory authority to vote in an en banc proceeding). But the
emphasis in Mathews on the failure of the deceased judge to view the concurring and
dissenting opinions suggests something more – namely, that those unread opinions
may have affected the judge’s vote.
Motions practice. In the early 1980s, the local rule governing motions
practice in the D.C. Circuit assigned three judges to weekly panels that heard and
decided motions on all pending cases. But only two of the three assigned judges
actually attended the motions meetings; the third judge was brought in only when the
two attending judges disagreed. This procedure applied not only to routine motions,
but also to motions for summary affirmance, which could potentially dispose of an
appeal on the merits. In United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the
court upheld the use of the procedure in that latter manner, but did so over a vigorous
dissent. Among other objections, Judge Mikva emphasized that the summary
affirmance procedure eliminates “the pluralism that is the benchmark of the appellate
process.” Id. at 51. That benchmark stems from a “belief that the more minds
considering a matter, the better the ultimate resolution of the case is likely to be.” Id.
Because procedures that use two judges rather than three “substantially reduces this
pluralism,” id., they should be avoided, at least in situations where the motion being
considered can “terminate an appeal . . . or otherwise directly affect the rights of the
litigants,” id. This is perhaps the clearest and most vigorous recognition of the
dynamic process of judicial decision-making – and of the need to adopt procedures
that recognize and support that dynamic process – in the Federal Reporter.
147
Frost, supra note 141, at 585; see also Roberts, supra note 96.
148
Frost, supra note 141, at 584.
149
Id. (“Providing for an impartial decisionmaker on the question of recusal
serves both to prevent actual injustice and the appearance of injustice. Ensuring that
the decision is made by a neutral decisionmaker would protect the integrity of the
challenged judge and the judiciary as a whole in those cases where disqualification is
not justified.”).
150
This is not to say that there is no connection at all. But the involvement of a
biased judge in the decision-making process is strongly linked to unfairness, while
the failure to add a third judge to a two judge quorum is less so.
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unconscious bias is undiminished, and this raises serious concerns
about current approaches – and any modified approach – that place
decision-making authority in the hands of the quorums themselves.
At least two categories of unconscious bias may affect the
ability of potential quorums to make appropriate self-assessments.
First, the remaining two judges are likely to exhibit some form of
overconfidence bias. Overconfidence bias explains situations where
individuals who are aware of the general likelihood of a negative (or
positive) event nevertheless conclude that their particular likelihood is
less (or greater) than average.151 For example, litigants aware of the
general likelihood that a claim like theirs will be rejected may
nevertheless conclude that their particular claim is one of the outliers
that will buck the trend. An overconfidence bias might manifest in
two different ways in the context of quorums. A judge might
acknowledge that judges as a whole would benefit from the addition of
a third judge, but may nevertheless conclude that he himself would not
so benefit.152 Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, a judge might
acknowledge in the abstract that she herself would benefit from the
addition of another judge in a certain set of cases, but might
nevertheless be resistant to conclude that any particular case belongs
in that set. Put in hypothetical numerical terms, Judge A exhibits the
first form of overconfidence bias if he concludes that the addition of a
third judge would make a difference in 50% of overall cases, but only
in 25% of cases involving him, and Judge B exhibits the second form
of overconfidence bias if she concludes that she would benefit from
the addition of a third judge in 50% of all cases involving her, but
chooses to add a third judge in only 25% of cases in practice.
This latter form of bias is related to overconfidence, but it
stems from selection difficulties rather than from a categorical
underestimation of likelihoods. The essence of the problem is that
when two judges in the midst of a decision both agree on how that
151

For a general discussion of the overconfidence bias and some implications
for law, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1091-93 (2000).
152
There is a measurement problem associated with the overconfidence bias
because it is at least plausible that a person might accurately conclude that some
negative event is less likely to affect them than the population as a whole. In other
words, because some people are better-than-average drivers, every instance of selfreporting that reflects a conclusion of that sort cannot be categorized as indicative of
overconfidence bias. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 151, at 1091.
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decision should play out, they will not easily envision the decision
going another way. There is a substantial lack of perspective that is
created by involvement in the particulars of the decision. As a result,
although they might agree in the abstract that certain cases may be
subject to reconsideration or modification upon the infusion of another
set of views, the two judges in practice are systematically prone to
conclude that the case at issue is not one of those cases.153 However
categorized, the result of this tendency is that case-by-case decisionmaking by those involved in the decision will lead to the appointment
of a third judge in fewer cases in practice than is ideal.154
So far, these biases are unrelated to any underlying interest that
a judge has in the decision or the decisional process. In contrast, a
second category of bias is rooted precisely in such interests.
Specifically, if the concern for efficiency and managing caseload is
especially salient, the tendency to conclude that a particular case is not
one that would benefit from the addition of a third judge will increase.
This may be categorized as a form of self-serving or confirmatory bias
in the sense that the information is unconsciously analyzed to serve the
interests of the analyzer.155 To be sure, judges also have interests in
fairness and justice, and when they realize that fairness would not be
served by proceeding as a quorum, they may well choose to place that
interest above any interest in efficiency. But the operation of these
biases might just mean that the judge is put to this choice less often
than we would like because the interest in fairness is marginalized
when judges conclude – whether consciously or sub-consciously – that
fairness is not implicated and that the interest in efficiency can be
safely pursued.156
153

This dynamic also has a flavor of status quo bias, with the status quo defined
as the decision already reached by the two remaining judges. See generally Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
154
This is where the logic of futility plays an unwelcome role: it allows judges
an easy route to conclude that a third judge would make no difference. See
discussion infra Part II.B.2.
155
A related form of this bias may be based on conscious pursuit of interests.
To justify that pursuit, judges may convince themselves that their interests and the
interests of those affected by the decision are aligned. To the extent that his
empirical claim is inaccurate, Judge Boudin’s argument in opposition to certification
may be an example of his phenomenon. See text accompanying note Error!
Bookmark not defined..
156
A final source of distortion in the decision-making of quorums is the present
asymmetry of authority discussing the issue. Even when they have discretion to
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All of this significantly undercuts the appeal of an approach
that relies on self-assessment, even if “awareness-raising”
modifications are introduced. Even if we could reach a consensus
about the ideal point at which to switch from a policy of automatic
replacement to a policy of quorum review of the replacement decision,
serious difficulties remain when we rely on two judges who are
invested in the decision and immediately affected by it to evaluate
process values. Simply put, the result in Mathews and the dissent in
Glover are likely to remain relatively rare outliers,157 and neither
increasing judicial awareness of the process values at stake nor
introducing requirements to guide consideration of those values is
likely to change that. Both modifications may yield improvement, but
neither will result in accurate identification of cases where
replacement would be desirable because the same biases that infect the
free exercise of discretion will also infect its guided exercise.
2.

External Review

The biases just discussed are intractable because two
intertwined tasks – reaching a decision and assessing the process
decide, judges may be guided by the examples of others who have gone before them,
and precedent may therefore play an important function. As discussed in Part I.B,
the body of precedent relating to quorum decision-making is scant. But as with
judicial recusal, that which exists is skewed because of an asymmetry of publication
practices. See Frost, supra note 139, at 570; John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging
and Theories of Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 244-45 (1987).
When two judges decide to add a third judge, they almost always do so without
comment, and indeed the decision is essentially invisible. Conversely, when two
judges decline to add a third judge, the resulting opinion at least mentions the
decision and the authority supporting it. And the few cases that have prompted
courts to issue a written opinion defending a decision in the quorum context have
been those where a third judge is not added. As a result, the published cases dealing
with quorums constitute a list of justifications for proceeding as a quorum, while
justifications for adding a third judge are essentially nonexistent. See id. (“Published
opinions . . . form an accumulating mound of reasons and precedents against
withdrawal; meanwhile, some judges routinely and silently disqualify themselves in
comparable cases.”).
157
See discussion supra at note 146. Curbelo is slightly different in that it
involves judicial evaluation of jury decision-making; the self-assessment problem is
therefore not present. For criticisms of the tendency by courts to treat jury decisionmaking and judicial decision-making differently, see Gary Solomon, I Got the PostMckeiver Blues, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 105 (2007) (discussing whether judges can
really disregard inadmissible evidence in the context of conducting bench trials).
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values of the decision reached - are assigned to the same individual or
group. Task separation may help. Separation alleviates many of the
problems associated with self-assessment, and should lead to a more
accurate assessment of process values. In the recusal context, both
Debra Bassett and Amanda Frost have recently suggested
modifications to the current approach that reflect this insight.158 Rather
than relying on judges to decide the recusal issue themselves, both
would refer that decision to a “disinterested judge” or set of judges, at
least in situations where the interested judge does not voluntarily
recuse.
A similar modification might be made in the quorum context.
Rather than relying on the two remaining panel members to assess the
question of whether a third judge should be added, that question could
instead be referred to a non-panel judge or group of judges. As with
the recusal proposals, it makes sense to require the two remaining
judges to make a self-assessment in the first instance. Self-assessment
should lead to replacement in clear cases, and should do so efficiently
because the two judges will have to invest relatively few resources to
make the assessment. But where self-assessment yields a conclusion
that no replacement is necessary, that conclusion should not simply
stand but should instead be reviewed by at least one disinterested
judge. One source of review might be the chief judge of the circuit,
provided that the chief judge was not already assigned to the original
panel. Another possibility is review by a motions panel of the court.159
For recusal, the suggestion is that disinterested judges should
independently assess whether the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned; similarly, the disinterested judge or judges
should independently assess whether the addition of a third judge
would contribute substantive or procedural benefits that would justify
a potential delay in the resolution of the appeal.
Adding a layer of external review of process values should
better identify situations where a quorum decision is undesirable, but
there are significant downsides. To begin, there is reason to question
how extensive the accuracy gains associated with external review will
be in practice. This is because the layer of review is not truly external,
158

Bassett’s is limited to the federal appellate courts, Bassett supra note 95,
while Frost’s extends to all levels of the federal judiciary, Frost supra note 139.
159
Frost, supra note 141, at 584 (“The laws governing judicial disqualification
should require that motions to disqualify go to a disinterested judge unless the judge
who is the target of the motion agrees to recuse himself.”)
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but is performed by other members of the same court who, although
perhaps not invested in the particular decision being reviewed, are
nevertheless invested in other ways. They are affected by the various
interests implicated by the review, and may therefore overvalue
efficiency gains associated with allowing quorum decisions.
Moreover, they are invested in the behavioral norms of the court more
broadly, which may contribute to a reticence to second-guess decisions
reached by other members. Concerns of this sort have been raised in
other contexts, including recusal160 and judicial misconduct.161 The
nature of the review – and of the reviewers – means that some bias in
the consideration of the competing interests involved will remain.
The more significant problem with an external review
approach relates to its resource costs. The approach entails the
addition of new decisionmakers engaged in a new layer to the
decisional process, and the result is a significant expense in terms of
both time and judicial effort. Relative to recusal, this expense is less
justifiable in the quorum context for several reasons. First, the
different nature of the review means that the resource costs are likely
to be larger in the quorum context. External review of recusal
decisions assesses a judge’s interest – real or perceived – in the
outcome of a given case, and that assessment is essentially a satellite
inquiry that is quite apart from the merits of the case. In most cases,
the relevant questions are whether the judge had relationships with
various parties or lawyers that raise the possibility that impartiality
might be compromised. But in order to properly assess whether a
third judge should be added to a potential quorum, external reviewers
should be expected to familiarize themselves with the particulars of
the case. The relevant questions are whether the issues involved in the
case are such that the disposition of the appeal would benefit
materially from the addition of a third judge and whether that benefit
would be outweighed by its associated delay. Those questions do not
necessitate a full-scale merits review, but they are markedly more
connected with the substantive issues involved with the appeal, and an
160

Frost, supra note 141 at 585-86 (expressing concern that “judges might not
be any more willing to disqualify their colleagues than they are to recuse
themselves”).
161
See, e.g., David Barnhizer, “On the Make”: Campaign Funding and the
Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 424 (2001)
(describing flaws in the strategy of having judges self-sanction other judges for
violating campaign contribution laws).
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increase in the time and effort necessary to make the assessment
should therefore be expected.
Second, and more importantly, the larger resource expenditures
on external review are not necessary in the quorum context. Adding a
layer of external review introduces a layer of resource expense that is
devoted not to the ultimate decision but to a subsidiary question. That
layer of expense is most easily justified in circumstances where the
outcomes produced absent the expenditure are unsatisfactory. Recusal
is arguably one such example: absent external review, the only viable
approach is self-assessment, and if that approach is simply
unacceptable, the expense associated with external review may be
necessary. But in the context of quorums, there is a third option:
automatic replacement. This option is not viable in the context of
recusal because the triggering event for the replacement decision – a
challenge to judicial impartiality – is within the control of the parties
to the litigation.162 As a result, a regime of automatic replacement
would be subject to manipulation, and some form of review is
therefore necessary to protect against that result. But the triggering
event for the quorum decision – unavailability of an appellate panel
member – is random and essentially outside party control. Automatic
substitution is thus a viable approach, and the expenditure on external
review mechanisms must also be justified in reference to that
approach, and not just to a competing approach of self-assessment. As
the next section demonstrates, automatic substitution provides a
superior mix of results and costs, and is therefore preferable to
external review.
3.

Automatic Replacement

Rather than guiding discretion or shifting discretion to a
different decision-maker, the best modification to the current approach
may be to remove discretion altogether. In concrete terms, this would
mean the adoption a firm policy of replacement in all cases and the
162

Even so, some examples of peremptory challenges in the judicial context
exist. See BERKSON & DORFMAN, JUDICIAL SUBSTITUTION: AN EXAMINATION OF
JUDICIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES (1986); Baron, A Proposal for the Use of a
Judicial Peremptory Challenge System in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 49 (1988).
Following these examples, Frost has suggested a limited presumption in favor of
recusal, such that a party’s challenge to judicial impartiality would lead to automatic
transfer to a different judge, but only if the party has not previously raised such a
challenge in the given action. Frost, supra note 141, at 585-86.
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removal of authority for two judges to proceed by quorum. As with all
firm rules, one of the key advantages of an automatic replacement
approach is predictability and consistency. Judges and parties will
know that the disposition of every appeal will be issued by a full panel
of three judges, and thus when an instance of unavailability arises,
there will be little confusion about how to proceed.
Of course, consistency is hardly a virtue if the approach leads
to consistently undesirable results. But that outcome is not likely.
Automatic replacement leads to error only in those cases where the
expediency value of deciding the appeal with only two judges
outweighs the gains associated with the participation of a third judge.
Although such errors are possible, there is no reason to think that the
error rate will be higher than that produced by any competing method.
Self-assessment will lead to errors in the other direction – that is,
failure to add a third judge where one would be useful – owing to the
tendency to overvalue efficiency and undervalue the contributions of a
hypothetical third panel member. Indeed, because the prevailing
practice is to decide by quorum whenever the two judges constituting
a potential quorum agree, the self-assessment model operates much as
a firm policy of non-replacement would, and errors occur whenever
the contributions of a third judge would in fact be worth the delay and
expense triggered by the addition. If a perfectly accurate assessment
of cases in circumstances where the two remaining judges disagree
would add a third judge more than half of the time – an almost certain
outcome given a proper understanding of the third judge’s role – then
the raw number of errors generated by self-assessment will exceed the
number generated by automatic substitution.
Moreover, the errors produced by automatic substitution are
less significant than those produced under any kind of self-assessment
regime.
The automatic substitution error adds a third judge
unnecessarily, thus contributing to a more expensive and less
expedient resolution of the appeal. This is waste, to be sure, but it is
not otherwise lamentable. On the other hand, the failure to add a third
judge leads to a disposition that is potentially less accurate, more
ideological, and less likely to be viewed as legitimate by the parties to
the appeal. In short, if some errors are unavoidable, it is better to err
on the side of unnecessary replacement, and those are the only errors
possible in a regime of automatic substitution.
Similar arguments about quality – and perhaps quantity –
suggest that automatic substitution is also preferable to external
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review. External review should lead to accuracy gains, which may
reduce the incidence of error to a level below that generated by
automatic substitution. That is far from a guaranteed outcome,
however, and depends on just how well an external review approach
works in practice. Even if the quantity of errors were diminished
substantially, the quality of those errors would remain problematic
because errors in both directions should be expected. Again,
automatic substitution is appealing because it confines errors to those
that are least troubling.
Aside from the qualitative difference in the outcomes produced
by the competing approaches, there is another reason to prefer
automatic substitution over external review: it generates its errors at a
much lower cost. External review requires the devotion of resources
to the review process itself, whereas automatic substitution involves
no such intermediate layer. Imagine that engaging in external review
consumes 10 units of judicial resources, and that contributing to an
appellate outcome (if the external review triggers the addition of a
third judge) consumes 20 such units. Thus, in an external review
regime, 30 total units of resources are consumed for those cases where
a third judge is added, while 10 units are consumed for all others. The
difference between the external review regime and an automatic
substitution regime, at least in terms of final outcomes, is defined by
the class of cases for which the external review regime declines to add
the third judge (the “all others” mentioned above). If there were 10
such cases out of a pool of 100, the external review process would
effectively add a judicial expenditure of 1000 units (10 units for each
of the 100 cases reviewed) in order to save 200 units. A similar
argument can be made with respect to expediency because the process
of engaging in external review creates an intermediate delay in every
case, and only spares the subsequent delay caused by substitution in
those cases where the review authorizes decision by quorum. The
magnitude of these inefficiencies are obviously dependent on
consumption costs and case frequencies, but the general point is that
the expenditure of resources on the external review process in every
case means that the accuracy gains relative to an automatic
substitution approach would have to be overwhelming to be justifiable.
As a final point, automatic substitution conveys a strong
message about the importance of multi-judge decision-making at the
appellate level. That message is consistent with the procedural
modifications introduced in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
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1982, and with the accompanying Senate Report that repeatedly
emphasized the need for appeals to be “the collective product of at
least three minds.”163 Indeed, the lone current example of a firm
substitution policy – the Ninth Circuit’s – has its origins as a response
to the clear goals of the 1982 Act.164 Moreover, a policy of automatic
replacement harmonizes the treatment of irregular panels. A policy of
self-assessment or external review, even if it generates an identical
outcome in a substantial percentage of cases, cannot match the
symbolic value of a categorical rule, and for that reason too, automatic
substitution is a preferable approach.
In terms of implementation, automatic replacement might be
realized in one of two ways: the current statutory authority for
quorum decisions might be removed through legislative action, or the
exercise of statutory authority might be constrained through judicial
action. Before considering whether one approach or the other is
preferable, it is first necessary to consider whether courts have leeway
to place restrictions on the exercise of legislatively provided authority.
On at least two occasions, the possibility of a negative answer to that
question has been offered as support for liberal acceptance of quorum
decisions. First, in Murray, Judge Newman refused to interpret local
rules to preclude quorum decisions in situations where statutory
authority for those decisions exists in part because he was concerned
that “a rigid application of the local rule would arguably place it in
tension with the statutory authority of two judges to constitute a
quorum.”165 The brief for the United States in Nguyen made a similar
but significantly more forceful claim. After discussing Ayrshire,166
which required the use of three district judges in circumstances where
no quorum provision was supplied by Congress, the brief asserted:
Ayrshire thus stands for the proposition that, where
Congress expressly says that ‘[a]ll three judges . . .
must fully perform the judicial function,’ courts cannot
permit less. By the same token, when Congress says

163

For further discussion of the Act, see supra Part I.A.
See follow-up e-mail from Cathy Catterson, April 27, 2007.
165
Murray, 35 F.3d at 48. As should be clear from the tenor of the quote, Judge
Newman’s concern was at the level of dicta.
166
331 U.S. 132 (1947). Ayrshire is discussed supra at note 47.
164
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that a majority – two judges – may act for a panel of
three, courts cannot require more.167
These arguments, which suggest that legislative action is the
only acceptable means of implementing a policy of automatic
substitution, are misguided. Courts routinely enact local procedures
that are more demanding than the baseline requirements established by
statute,168 and no serious arguments have been lodged against that
practice. At least in the quorum context, the practice appears to have
been anticipated and indeed invited.169 Implicit in this formulation is
the possibility that the circuit courts could also decline to do so, and
the Ninth Circuit’s response represents an exercise of that option.
Perhaps the best interpretation of the government’s argument in
Nguyen (although not of Murray) is that the Supreme Court may not
impose additional requirements on the lower courts. That argument,
which calls into question the supervisory power of the Supreme Court,
is a much closer one,170 but even it stops short of imposing any
restriction on the ability of the circuit courts to supervise themselves.
In short, both legislative and judicial modifications are viable.
In terms of effect, there is little reason to prefer one over the other.
Both accomplish the goal of requiring substitution in instances of
judicial unavailability, and with roughly equal force. A statutory
change would perhaps be less susceptible to erosion by judicial
interpretation, but not appreciably so.171 The biggest difference
167

Brief of US, Nguyen, at 17-18 (quoting Ayrshire, 331 U.S. at 138).
One example is the Seventh Circuit’s approach to judges sitting by
designation. Even though the statute permits such judges to sit by designation, the
Seventh Circuit started banning visiting judges in 1993 under then Chief Judge
Posner. See Lindquist supra note 116. For a recent discussion of the ability of
appellate courts to introduce rules of appellate practice, see Greenlaw v. United
States, 554 U. S. ____ (2008) (June 23, 2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
169
The Senate Report to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 noted that
“the circuit courts could continue to adopt local rules permitting the disposition of an
appeal in situations in which one of the three judges dies or becomes disabled and
the remaining two agree on the disposition.” S. Rep. 97-275 at 19 (emphasis added).
170
See generally Amy Coney Barnett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme
Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006).
171
The willingness of the Second Circuit in Murray, 35 F.3d at 48, to
circumvent an existing local rule through interpretation is an example of the
susceptibility of local procedures to this type of erosion. It is uncertain, of course,
whether the result in Murray would have been any different had the source of
authority been statutory instead.
168
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between the two is at the level of implementation: a judicial solution
is somewhat easier to accomplish. The courts of appeals control local
rulemaking, and can modify existing rules and procedures as they
apply to unavailability and quorums. Moreover, locating the source of
the constraint at the judicial level preserves a greater degree of
flexibility should the need for further modification arise.172 The
downsides here are a potential lack of consistency across circuits that
stems from uncoordinated local action, as well as the potential
resistance to an automatic substitution policy by judges who continue
to embrace various rationales for widespread quorum practice. If
courts are simply unwilling to consider a shift toward automatic
substitution, then the legislative avenue may become preferable as a
matter of necessity.
CONCLUSION
This is an area where the Ninth Circuit has it right. A
categorical requirement that three authorized judges decide every
appeal produces multiple benefits. It harmonizes the treatment of
irregular panels, and removes the curious distinction between the
presence of an invalid third member and the absence of a third
member altogether. It eliminates the need for judges to self-assess the
costs and benefits associated with panel irregularities, and reduces the
errors generated by that self-assessment. It is consistent with the view
expressed in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 that the
resolution of an appeal should reflect the input of three minds. Most
important, it recognizes and supports the dynamic nature of appellate
decision making.

172

Even if no further need for modification is likely, maintaining the ability to
modify may assuage the fears of some judges who remain convinced that certain
circumstances may trigger the need to exercise the statutory authority for a quorum
decision.

